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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The concern over each of the[] symptoms of 
immigration—whether harmful or beneficial—can be 
traced to a single issue: the American people care about 
who the immigrants are.  It matters if the immigrants might 
need social services or if they might instead contribute to 
the funding of the programs in the welfare state.  It matters 
if the immigrants compete with disadvantaged workers in 
the labor market and take their jobs away, or if the 
immigrants do jobs that natives do not particularly want and 
would go unfilled in the immigrants’ absence. . . .  [I]t 
matters if the immigrants will want to adapt to the social, 
economic, and political environment of the United States, 
or if they will fight to maintain their language and culture 
for several generations.” 
-George Borjas1 
Immigration reform and the enforcement of immigration law 
have gained visibility in recent years.  Even prior to the recent 
upsurge of attention to comprehensive immigration reform, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States2 and President 
Obama’s Deferred Action towards Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) 
policy3 thrust to the forefront of national attention the questions that 
define the deportation regime.4  Deportation as a legal regime, rather 
than a specific sanction, is defined by answers to three core questions: 
how many people should be deported?  Which people, or what types 
of people, should be deported?  Finally, who should choose how 
many and what types of people should be deported?  The battle 
 
 1  GEORGE BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY, 4–5 (1999). 
 2  132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 3  DACA is the executive policy of deferring action with regard to some young 
people, who arrived prior to their 16th birthday, and have no criminal records. See 
Deferred Action towards Childhood Arrivals, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals.  
 4  In this Article, “deportation” refers to what that term meant until 1996: the 
removal of a non-citizen, who is already inside the country, as opposed to 
“exclusion,” the removal of a non-citizen who is forbidden from entry at a border or 
port of entry.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) consolidated exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting 
proceedings “removal” proceedings.  See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–597 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 
1015(e)–(f) (2006)) §§ 304, 308.  Because the concern here is exclusively with 
interior enforcement, this Article employs the legally outdated, but more 
appropriate term “deportation.” 
TREYGER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
2014] THE DEPORTATION CONUNDRUM 109 
 
between the federal government and subnational authorities is waged 
largely over the first question, regarding the appropriate level of 
enforcement, and the third question, regarding who is authorized to 
determine levels of enforcement.  So-called “restrictionist” 
jurisdictions proclaim their authority to “add [their] own resources to 
the enforcement of federal law,” and thereby to apprehend a greater 
number of deportable individuals.5  On the other hand, non-
cooperating or “sanctuary” jurisdictions declare that they “don’t do 
[the federal government’s] job,” and thereby limit federal access to 
deportable individuals.6  The question of which of the many 
deportable non-citizens should be deported is largely relegated to the 
background. 
This Article argues that it is the second question that ought to be 
at the forefront of deportation policy.  In this respect, the 
deportation regime is analogous to the immigration admissions 
regime.  Concerns over immigration, as George Borjas observes, “can 
be traced to the single” question of “who the immigrants are.”7  
Similarly, concerns over interior immigration enforcement are at 
their core about the problem of selecting whom to deport.  
Grappling with this question—indeed, the very fact of asking it—
requires accepting the impossibility and the undesirability of full 
enforcement, and the consequent necessity of a priority-based 
regime.  A priority-based regime must target the least socially 
desirable types for expulsion, just as the immigration admissions 
regime purports to select the most socially desirable types for 
admission into the United States.  The thorny problem of identifying 
and ranking “types” in terms of social desirability calls for evaluating 
the most serious consequences of immigrant presence, as judged by 
those who experience those consequences.  The consequences of 
immigrant presence—and thus, the expected consequences of 
deporting some immigrants—are spatially variable and numerous.  
This fact has underappreciated implications for the third question 
defining the deportation regime, the question of who should choose 
whom to deport.  This Article suggests that while functional 
considerations justify exclusive federal control over the level of 
enforcement, the nature of the most keenly experienced 
 
 5  Brief for Petitioners at *26, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 6 Santa Clara County Ends Collaboration with ICE, NEW AMERICA MEDIA (Oct. 18, 
2011), http://newamericamedia.org/2011/10/santa-clara-county-ends-collaboration
-with-ice.php (quoting County Board Supervisor George Shirakawa). 
 7  BORJAS, supra note 1, 4–5. 
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consequences of migrant presence calls for sub-federal participation 
in priority-setting. 
Although there is a growing literature on immigration 
enforcement and immigration federalism,8 it has thus far overlooked 
the question of how deportation priorities should be determined, 
and what implications the answers have for the division of labor 
among levels of governments.  Some immigration scholars have been 
critical of most sub-federal involvement in immigration enforcement 
generally.9  Others, by contrast, acknowledge that some state and local 
participation must take place and that this is not necessarily a cause 
for regret.10  Scholars have called broadly for “learning to live with 
immigration federalism,”11 “taking immigration federalism 
seriously,”12 and embracing a “new power-sharing theory” of 
immigration federalism.13  When this scholarship addresses the sub-
federal role in the deportation regime, the focus is on the activities 
 
 8  The term “immigration federalism” is usually credited to Hiroshi Motomura, 
in his article Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (describing “immigration federalism” as a system 
in which sub-federal actors participate in making and implementing immigration law 
and policy). 
 9  See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS LAW J. 1673 (2011) (arguing against state 
experimentation with immigration enforcement in part on the grounds that states 
cannot fully internalize the costs of their experiments); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of 
Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1613 
(2008) (urging more critical evaluation of the use of state and local police powers to 
influence the enforcement of immigration laws); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-
Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for 
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 36 (2007) (“[T]here is no good or legitimate 
reason to extend immigration enforcement to non-federal authorities any more than 
current law already allocates.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution 
of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
 10  See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 634 (2008) (arguing for federal-state cooperation 
such as using agreements delegating enforcement power); Peter H. Schuck, Taking 
Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 71–77 (2007) (advocating “a 
more robust role for the states in certain areas of immigration policy” including 
enforcement). 
 11  Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 
1627 (1997). 
 12  Schuck, supra note 10. 
 13  Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 617; see also Clare Huntington, The Constitutional 
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 827 (2008) (arguing that as 
a constitutional matter, “immigration authority may be shared among levels of 
government,” which should “open[] the door to weighing the interests and values 
traditionally implicated in debates over the respective roles of the national and 
subnational governments”).  
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that states and localities have or are in fact engaged in, such as 
federal delegation of authority to local officials and unilateral 
immigration-status verification policies.14 
Most scholars and commentators find existing modes of sub-
federal influence on enforcement to be at least problematic, if not 
outright unconstitutional.15  They may well be right.  But there is no 
reason why participation of states and localities in the deportation 
regime must be limited to the kinds of activities these actors have 
thus far undertaken.  This Article suggests that the purposes of the 
deportation regime would be best served by opening an alternative 
avenue for sub-federal influence.  Because centrally crafted and 
nation-wide priorities are poor proxies for sorting migrants on the 
basis of social desirability, the deportation regime would be improved 
if sub-national governments were explicitly invited to articulate their 
priorities.  At the same time, because states and localities do not bear 
the full costs of administering the deportation regime, they are not 
well-positioned to determine enforcement levels. 
The de jure federal monopoly on setting priorities for 
deportation restricts the channels whereby states and localities may 
influence deportation outcomes.  At present, states and localities 
cannot meaningfully influence which types of non-citizens the federal 
government chooses to deport.  Thus, their opposition to federal 
policy takes the form of efforts to overwhelm federal immigration 
authorities with enforcement requests or obstruct federal 
 
 14 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 635 (arguing that federal/sub-federal 
cooperation—such as via 287(g) agreements—should be pursued); Schuck, supra 
note 10, at 74–75 (arguing for coordination between federal and sub-federal 
authorities via 287(g) agreements); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1597–98 (discussing the 
rise of mandatory and non-verification policies with regard to immigration status, 
287(g) agreements, and substantive criminal laws that parallel federal prohibitions). 
 15  See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 635 (noting that the constitutionally and 
statutorily permitted space for local participation in law enforcement is limited to 
express delegation via 287(g) agreements and standard law enforcement); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819, 1819 (2011) (cautioning 
that “[a]ny federal policy that . . . permit[s] state and local priorities to decide which 
noncitizens will be exposed to federal immigration enforcement [] risks abdication 
of federal authority over immigration”).  For arguments about unconstitutionality of 
dominant modes of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, see, e.g., 
Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L. J. 251 (2011), Michael J. Wishnie, State 
and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004).  But 
see David Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 101, 107 (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that at least “nonbinding executive 
enforcement policies cannot, and should not, preempt sub-federal law”). 
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enforcement through non-cooperation.  In this way, all 
disagreements between the levels of government culminate in a 
stand-off regarding levels of enforcement.  Disagreements over how 
many people the country should deport are unresolvable and 
unproductive. This general proposition applies with particular force 
to the present circumstances.  To quote the former Governor of 
Mississippi, Haley Barbour, with regard to the prospects of deporting 
the entire ten to eleven million-strong population of unauthorized 
immigrants, “there’s a 100% chance that it’s not going to happen.”16  
And ultimately, the disagreement over how many people to deport is 
divorced from the core reasons why anyone opposes, welcomes, or 
tolerates unauthorized immigration.  People oppose or welcome 
immigration, legal or not, for substantive reasons.  This is why people 
care about “who the immigrants are.”  For the same reasons, people 
care about who the deportees are.  Inviting sub-federal participation 
in formulating priorities for deportation would reset the focal point 
of the (inevitable) federal/sub-federal disagreements about 
deportation policy to the more important questions of who, or which 
types of immigrants, should be selected for deportation, and which 
for forbearance.  Such a prospect would make for a deportation 
regime that produces enforcement patterns more closely 
approximating societal preferences. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II articulates a view of a 
well-functioning, or “optimal,” deportation regime.17  Though the 
deportation regime may be seen as serving two functions, screening 
and law enforcement, Part II.A and II.B show that both lead to 
harmonious conclusions regarding the key features of the regime, 
including the determination of which types of immigration violators 
should be subjected to a higher probability of deportation.  Part II.C. 
then explains why the nature of costs and benefits relevant to setting 
priorities for deportation—that is, identifying types of immigration 
law violators that should be prioritized as targets for deportation—
calls for sub-federal participation.  Part III examines more closely the 
 
 16  Governor Haley Barbour, Morning Keynote Address, 10th Annual 
Immigration Law and Policy Conference (Oct. 31, 2013). 
 17  “Optimal” here invokes policies most conducive to the welfare of the host 
society under given constraints, such as constitutional limits on policy choices and 
the reality of widespread violations of the immigration laws.  The Article adopts the 
welfare of the host society as the relevant criterion not because the welfare of 
immigrants or immigrant-sending societies is unimportant, but in recognition of the 
fact that it is the natives’ welfare that overwhelmingly drives policy-making. The 
Article proceeds from the assumption that some violators will be deported, and takes 
no view as to the normative desirability of deportation as such. 
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way the deportation regime has been functioning on the ground.  
Under the status quo, energetic sub-federal subversion of federal 
policy makes it very difficult for federal authorities to actualize a 
regime based on their own unilaterally set priorities.  States and 
localities are able to push for the deportation of individuals the 
federal government would not have pursued, or to obstruct federal 
authorities in pursuing those they have pursued.  Crucially, however, 
sub-federal actors are not able to exert meaningful influence over the 
setting of priorities, the task that they are best equipped to take on.  
Thus, this Article suggests opening alternative avenues for sub-federal 
participation in priority-setting. 
II. THE OPTIMAL DEPORTATION REGIME 
This Part sets out a conception of an optimal deportation regime 
through the lens of its two dominant functions.  It demonstrates that 
such a regime would be characterized by under-enforcement and 
priority-driven allocation of resources.  It then proceeds to 
characterize the relevant costs and benefits that should inform 
priority-setting.  Given the character and the distribution of the direct 
and indirect costs of deportation, the federal government is better 
situated to determine the answer to the first question defining the 
deportation regime—the “how many” question—while sub-federal 
governments are better situated to inform the answer to the second 
question of what types should be prioritized for deportation. 
A. Functions of the Deportation Regime and Underenforcement 
The deportation regime encompasses the detection and 
investigation of deportable non-citizens, their apprehension, their 
civil prosecution in an immigration court or other legal processing of 
their case, and their actual deportation out of the country.  
Deportation is not the only sanction that enforces the immigration 
laws, but it is an essential one, and one that is unique to immigration 
law.18  As one of the mechanisms for enforcement of the immigration 
 
 18  To be sure, deportation is not the only mechanism that enforces immigration 
laws: employer sanctions, border enforcement, and criminal prosecution, among 
others, also enforce the immigration laws.  The present discussion does not take into 
account the possibility that these other mechanisms might beneficially supplant or 
augment deportation.  Thinking about the immigration enforcement regime as a 
whole would certainly call for such consideration.  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits 
of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV.  65, 68 (2009) (explaining 
that immigration enforcement entails answering a large number of questions, such as 
“should we beef up enforcement?  If so, should we concentrate our resources at the 
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laws, the deportation regime may be seen through two lenses: as a 
screening mechanism, which is intended to advance the substantive 
purposes of the immigration regime, and as a penalty for the 
violations of the law, which vindicates the intrinsic rule-of-law values 
harmed by such violations.  Although, at some level of abstraction, 
these two functions of deportation are conceptually distinct—the first 
aimed at selecting people who are not wanted as part of the national 
community, and the second aimed at penalizing violations of laws—
they are not mutually exclusive.  And as argued here, both 
perspectives lead to harmonious conclusions as to the characteristics 
of an optimal deportation regime. 
The substantive purposes of the immigration regime encompass 
the reasons the United States, or any sovereign state, allows any in-
migration at all.  Immigration of non-citizens may serve valuable 
economic purposes, such as filling labor needs and increasing 
economic productivity.  Immigration may rectify demographic 
imbalances, by, for example, introducing young people into an aging 
community.  Immigration may reunite families and contribute to 
cultural diversity.  And of course, immigration may serve purely 
political or expressive functions: taking in refugees, for example, 
expresses and affirms a nation’s humanitarian values and signals 
disapproval of certain political regimes.  To the extent that 
immigration is welcomed at all, it is because in some relevant sense it 
is seen to augment the well-being of the host society. 
Allowing non-citizens into the country is not costless.  Too much 
immigration and/or the wrong types of immigrants may harm, 
rather than augment, the well-being of the host society: it may cause 
economic harm, destabilize the social fabric, or present risks to 
national security.  Thus, every sovereign state exerts some control 
over who may enter its borders and on what terms they may remain.  
Adam Cox and Eric Posner helpfully described these substantive 
goals of the immigration regime as entailing “first-order issues,” or 
preferences as to how many and what types of people we want to 
admit and under what conditions.19  At least in the abstract, there is 
some number and some types of immigrants that would best further 
those goals, while minimizing the costs. 
 
border, in the interior, or both?  Should we prioritize deportations, criminal 
prosecutions, or both?  Should we strengthen the employer sanctions regime? . . . 
[S]hould we offer legal status to . . . the undocumented population and, if so, under 
what conditions?”). 
 19  Adam Cox & Eric Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007). 
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The decisions regarding the number and types of immigrants 
that are formalized in admissions criteria are “second-order choices,” 
which seek to implement first-order preferences.20  Legal admissions 
criteria attempt to strike a favorable balance between the advantages 
of immigration and its costs by “screen[ing] applicants for admission 
so that the desired types are admitted and others are excluded.”21  
The American immigration system largely relies on numerical limits 
to determine how many and which of the potential incomers are in 
fact allowed in.  It would be nothing short of a miracle if statutory 
limits, notoriously slow and difficult to change, were to correspond to 
the levels and kind of immigration that would best advance the aims 
that justify immigration.  There is no reason to suppose, then, that 
the distinction between legal and extralegal flows tracks the 
distinction between advantageous and harmful immigration.  Most 
empirical scholarship does not distinguish between the effects of 
legal or extralegal arrivals on host societies, precisely on the 
presumption that the difference is merely legal and has no bearing 
on the extralegal effects of migration.22  One need not believe that all 
extralegal migration is socially desirable to be convinced that at least 
some part of it may enhance the welfare of the recipient population.23 
Because the presence of unauthorized migrants signals the 
inadequacy of legal admissions, the problem it presents is not merely 
one of punishing widespread violations of the law.  Unauthorized 
immigration also presents another, ex ante screening opportunity to 
implement first-order preferences.  In this light, the mass presence of 
unauthorized migrants in the country is no cause for regret.  As Cox 
 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  See, e.g., GORDON HANSON, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, 26 Council 
Special Report (Apr. 14, 2007) (“[T]here is little evidence that legal immigration is 
economically preferable to illegal immigration.”), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/economic-logic-illegal-immigration/p12969. 
 23 See, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Removal of Irregular Migrants in Europe and 
America 4 (Washington Univ. in St. Louis School of Law, Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 11-10-03, 2011) (“[T]he level of non-compliance is evidence that the law 
itself is insufficiently accommodating the relevant competing interests.”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945833.  For arguments 
regarding the economic efficiency of illegal migration, see, Hanson, supra note 22 
(“[I]llegal immigration more readily responds to market forces than legal 
immigration.”); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic 
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PENN. L. REV. 1147 (1997) (applying 
trade principles to immigration and concluding that liberalizing the immigration 
regime by, inter alia, eliminating quantitative immigration barriers, would enhance 
the national economic welfare as well as global economic welfare). 
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and Posner point out, ex post screening via deportation has an 
important informational advantage over ex ante screening via the 
admissions regime because more is known about the potential 
deportees than was the case before they entered the country.24  If we 
focus on the screening function, it is virtually axiomatic that not all 
deportable persons should be deported.  To say that the deportation 
regime serves a screening function is not merely an academic idiom.  
Surveying the case law as well as statutory evolution, Stephen 
Legomsky and Cristina Rodriguez note that the deportation regime 
cannot be realistically described as simply a corrective for “admissions 
errors” or penalties for “violations of conditions imposed on entry.”25  
Instead, as the Supreme Court put it in 1924, the function of 
deportation is “to rid the country of persons who had shown by their 
career that their continued presence here would not make for the 
safety or welfare of society,” and implicitly, to show forbearance 
towards those, whose continued presence would enhance such 
welfare.26 
The view of deportation as a screening mechanism is not at odds 
with the view of it as a system of penalties for violations of the law.  
Even if a migrant otherwise contributes to the public welfare, the fact 
of his violation of the immigration laws undermines the rule of law 
and makes him a less socially desirable type.27  The societal interest in 
maintaining the rule of law, however, is just one among many 
competing interests that migration implicates.  Even if we elevate the 
intrinsic value of the law over all extrinsic social purposes migration 
serves, it would still not be optimal to seek deportation of all the 
violators.  That is for the familiar reasons that make it undesirable to 
attempt total eradication of violations, rooted in both efficiency and 
normative considerations.28 
 
 24  See Cox & Posner, supra note 19.  
 25  STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 518 (2009). 
 26  Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924). 
 27  That proposition itself is contestable because violations of immigration law are 
not universally treated as violations of mala in se prohibitions.  See, e.g., Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2039 (2008) (“Is 
immigration outside the law a matter of egregious lawbreaking, or does it represent 
an invited contribution to the U.S. economy and society that the government 
tolerates?”).  
 28  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts 
That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (1992) (showing that even 
when society would wish to deter all violations of some type, because they are 
undesirable in themselves, “the benefits from deterrence often will be insufficient to 
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In this light, the problem of deportation is no different from any 
problem of optimal enforcement: socially optimal enforcement calls 
for deportation until marginal costs of an additional deportation 
equal its marginal benefits.  The social desirability of a particular 
migrant bears on the costs and benefits of deporting that migrant, 
and the full cost of deportation may outweigh the rule-of-law benefits 
thereof.  As elaborated in the next section, screening to distinguish 
the more socially desired types from the undesirable types, and 
assessing the costs and benefits of deportation to optimally enforce 
the immigration laws are the same problem, not two separate ones.29  
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law institutionalizes 
the recognition that forbearance from enforcement of the law, even 
against clear violators, will often be preferable to attempts at its 
enforcement.30  Similar to criminal law enforcement, the executive’s 
discretion in immigration enforcement is justified by the need to 
allocate scarce resources and by the need to ensure that the sanction 
 
justify the expenditures on enforcement that would be required to deter everyone”), 
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188/12/1; STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 488, 486 (2004) (explaining 
that “optimal law enforcement is characterized by underdeterrence—and perhaps 
substantial underdeterrence—due to the costliness of enforcement effort and limits 
on sanctions” and not due to the “social desirab[ility]” of the illegal act; indeed, 
“because of the costs of enforcement, it is possible that it will be optimal for there 
not to be any law enforcement, for society to countenance the harm in order to save 
the costs of law enforcement altogether”). 
 29  It is worth noting that the majority of the American public has never favored 
total deportation of all deportable individuals.  Consider the answers to the following 
Gallup poll question: “Which comes closest to your view about what government 
policy should be toward illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States?  
Should the government: (1) deport all illegal immigrants back to their home 
country; (2) allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work, 
but only for a limited amount of time; or (3) allow illegal immigrants to remain in 
the United States and become U.S. citizens, but only if they meet certain 
requirements over a period of time?” Immigration, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx/#2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
 Deport All Remain in the U.S. to Work Remain and Become a Citizen 
2011 Jun 9-12 21% 13% 64% 
2007 Mar 2-4 24% 15% 59% 
2006 Jun 8-25 16% 17% 66% 
 
 30  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A principal 
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 
officials.”); Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 823 n.3 (2009) (“Congress 
legislates against a background assumption of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
118 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
does not wholly frustrate the extrinsic purposes of the law.31  In both 
cases, we rely on the executive not to enforce laws against targets 
whose prosecution does not further the substantive goals of the 
relevant legal regime.32 
B.  Deciding Whom to Deport 
1.  The Costs and Benefits of Deportation 
How should scarce resources be allocated to best serve both the 
screening function and the law enforcement function?  How do we 
determine which types of migrants are socially undesirable, and with 
respect to whom the benefits of deportation are likely to exceed the 
costs?  To answer these questions, it is useful to distinguish between 
the direct and indirect consequences (i.e., costs and benefits) of 
deportation.  The direct cost of a deportation is its administrative cost, 
or the resources necessary to identify, apprehend, process, and 
actually remove a deportable person.  The direct benefit of a 
deportation is the vindication of the rule of law.  These costs and 
benefits are direct because they are invariably present for every 
potential deportation.  Let us presume for the moment that the 
deportable population is homogeneous with respect to these costs 
and benefits: that is, the administrative costs of deporting any one 
migrant are equivalent to those of deporting another, and the rule-of-
law benefit from penalizing one violation is equivalent to penalizing 
another.  Assuming this kind of homogeneity, the cost and benefit 
curves would look the same as they do in the context of criminal law: 
the marginal cost of enforcement rises and the marginal benefits 
 
 31  See, e.g., Declaration of Daniel H. Ragsdale, Appendix B, at ¶ 28, Georgia 
Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011) 
(declaring that “ICE does not seek to arrest, detain, remove, or refer for prosecution, 
all aliens who may be present in the United States illegally,” and exercises its 
discretion to “focus[] its enforcement efforts in a manner that is intended to most 
effectively further national security, public safety, and security of the border, and has 
affirmative reasons not to seek removal or prosecution of certain aliens”).  
 32  See, e.g., Hedder v Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision 
not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process is a decision 
generally committed to any agency’s absolute discretion.”).  For these reasons, legal 
actions to compel enforcement of immigration laws fare no better than legal actions 
to compel criminal investigation or prosecution: all such suits were dismissed.  See 
Huntington, supra note 13, at 789 n.42 (discussing the cases).  For a discussion of the 
reasons the police and prosecutors have no general duty to investigate and prosecute 
crimes, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (upholding “passive 
enforcement policy” that resulted in 16 prosecutions out of an estimated 674,000 
violators of a federal criminal law against an impermissible “selective prosecution” 
challenge).  
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decline with each additional deportation, for the same reasons that 
apply to modeling the costs and benefits of criminal law 
enforcement.  If the direct costs and benefits were the only relevant 
ones, and if we presumed a homogeneous migrant population, then 
the optimal enforcement level would be specified simply as a number 
of deportations. 
But the deportable population is not fully homogeneous with 
respect to those costs and benefits.  And importantly, the direct costs 
and benefits are not the ones most strongly influencing people’s 
preferences about how to enforce immigration laws.  The most 
profound disagreements about immigration enforcement stem 
primarily from disagreements over the relatively indirect 
consequences of deportation weighed against those of tolerating 
unauthorized migrant presence.  People oppose, welcome, or 
tolerate unauthorized migration for reasons apart from its illegality.  
These reasons stem from beliefs about the consequences of 
unauthorized migrant presence, or of immigration generally. 
The indirect consequences embrace the varied economic, social, 
demographic, and other effects that might accompany the choice to 
deport or forbear from deportation of violators.  The benefits of 
deportation are often treated as simply the mirror image of the costs 
of unauthorized presence, and vice versa.  That is, if unauthorized 
migrants are deemed to contribute to particular outcomes, desirable 
or not, deporting them would make those outcomes less likely.33  
These may be thought of as indirect costs and benefits of deportation 
because they do not inescapably accompany the removal of one or 
many people, but constitute more attenuated, speculative, and thus, 
contested phenomena.  With respect to such indirect consequences 
of enforcement choices, the migrant population is heterogeneous. 
That migrants are heterogeneous in this regard is intuitive at the 
individual level.  All else being equal, the deportation of a violent 
felon with no community ties would be universally preferred to the 
deportation of an otherwise law-abiding long-term resident, who fell 
out of status and has extensive ties to the community.34  Although 
 
 33  This, of course, may not be entirely true: it is possible, e.g., that immigration 
adversely affects the labor outcomes of some native workers, but that deporting 
unauthorized workers does not improve the situation of the affected natives.  
Nonetheless, for the purposes of analytic simplicity here, I refer to the impact of 
deportation and the impact of unauthorized migrant presence interchangeably, 
unless explicitly distinguished. 
 34  See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (observing that “workers trying to 
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or 
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deporting the felon and the long-term resident entails comparable 
administrative costs and rule-of-law benefits, targeting the former also 
carries the benefit of removing a criminal offender from the 
community, potentially deterring other deportable individuals from 
committing crimes.  Targeting the latter, on the other hand, creates 
no such additional benefits and may impose additional costs on the 
community in which the long-term resident is embedded.  Because 
migrants are heterogeneous with respect to the indirect 
consequences of their removal, the optimal deportation regime 
cannot be specified completely by reference to the desired level or 
number of deportees.35  Because the deportation of the felon confers 
a higher net benefit than the deportation of the long-term resident, it 
is not a matter of indifference which migrants are selected for 
deportation. 
To say, as Borjas does, that the “American people care about 
who the immigrants are,”36 is to assert precisely this: people feel 
differently about different types of immigrants because they perceive 
that some types impose net costs, while others confer net benefits.  
The most recent generation of empirical research supports Borjas’s 
assertion, demonstrating that public attitudes towards immigrants are 
conditional on the characteristics of the immigrants in question.37  
Particular types of immigrants are welcomed or not depending on 
whether they contribute to the consequences of immigrant presence 
that are of gravest concern.  An optimal deportation system would 
thus prioritize the individuals whose deportation would yield the 
highest net benefits (i.e., the less socially desired types), while 
forbearing from targeting those whose deportation would impose net 
costs (i.e., the more socially desired types).  The notion that 
identifiable “types” may actually be arranged from least to most 
 
aliens who commit a serious crime,” and thus, the latter should be prioritized for 
deportation). 
 35  But see Schuck, supra note 10, at 72 (“[O]nce the government has settled on an 
appropriate enforcement level, society has a compelling interest in seeing that the 
enforcement is carried out effectively at that level.”) (emphasis added). 
 36  Borjas, supra note 1, 4–5. 
 37  See Jens Hainmueller & Daniel J. Hopkins The Hidden American Immigration 
Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Massachusetts Inst. of 
Tech., Pol. Sci. Dep’t Working Paper No. 22, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2106116; Jens Hainmueller & 
Michael J. Hiscox, Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (2010); G. H. Hanson et al., Public 
Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization Strategies, 19 ECON. & POL. 33 
(2007). 
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desirable is, of course, an abstraction.  But it is a useful abstraction if 
the deportation regime is to serve its purpose as a screening 
mechanism that selects people for deportation on the basis of how 
socially desirable their presence is. 
It is a useful abstraction, too, if we focus on the law enforcement 
function.  A priority-based deportation regime is optimal whether 
one is concerned with deterrence of violations or the just penalty for 
the violation.  With respect to deterrence, the analogy with the 
criminal law enforcement system remains applicable.  For the 
purposes of general, rather than specific deterrence, the optimal 
sanction should increase with the severity of the harm from the illegal 
act.38  If enforcement of immigration laws via deportation has any 
deterrent effects,39 it is preferable to target resources to deter those 
types, whose violations cause the greatest harm.  In this regard, the 
immigration law enforcement problem may be conceptually harder 
than the criminal law enforcement problem because the social harm 
of crimes is usually readily identifiable and tied to the unlawful act 
(e.g., social harm of murder is the death of a human being).  This is 
not so with immigration law violations.  The social harm of 
immigration violations is rarely thought to inhere in the discrete act 
or omission that violated the law (e.g., unlawful entry, overstaying a 
visa) or its immediate consequences; rather, it is understood in terms 
of unlawful presence that ensues after the violation is committed.  
What makes an individual’s continuing presence costly or beneficial 
are characteristics and circumstances that are largely exogenous to 
the legal status itself.  An enforcement regime that succeeds in 
 
 38  See Shavell, supra note 28, at 518–19, 525 (addressing marginal deterrence and 
general deterrence); Steven Shavell, Specific versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. 
POL. ECON. 1088 (1991), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell
/pdf/99_J_Political_Econ_1088.pdf; Dilip Mookherjee & I. P. L. Png, Monitoring vis-
a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556 (1992), available at 
http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20310/eco8510/Mookherjee-Png_AER1992.pdf. 
 39  This proposition is itself contested.  See, e.g., Wayne A. Cornelius & Idean 
Salehyan, Does Border Enforcement Deter Unauthorized Immigration? The Case of Mexican 
Migration to the United States of America, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 139, 140 (2007) (finding 
that “tougher border controls have had remarkably little influence on the propensity 
of Mexican nationals to migrate illegally to the USA,” and noting that the finding is 
in harmony with other recent empirical studies on enforcement effects); see also infra 
note 214.  At the same time, there is some evidence that deportation has selection 
effects as to types of immigrants, and a deterrent effect on post-entry conduct.  See 
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne M. Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates so Low? 
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, WP-05-19, 2005) (showing that a broadening of the set of crimes that 
trigger deportation in the U.S. in the 1990s affected both the type of immigrants and 
their behavior once in the country).   
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marginally deterring violations that create greater social costs must 
prioritize enforcement against types that impose such costs.  Unlike 
criminal law, immigration law enforcement cannot shape violators’ 
incentives by calibrating the magnitude of the sanction to the severity 
of the violation.40  Calibrating the probability of the sanction is the 
only tool available with which to affect incentives of immigration law 
violators.41  Prioritizing certain types, therefore, means simply that 
more resources ought to be allocated to their apprehension and 
removal, raising the probability of the sanction relative to non-
priority types. 
A priority-based deportation regime remains optimal even if the 
deterrence value is discounted and the focus is instead on delivering 
a just or fitting sanction for the violation of the law.  Several scholars 
have criticized relatively indiscriminate enforcement by appealing to 
principles of proportionality.42  Indeed, some scholars have argued 
that since many of the grounds for deportation involve post-entry 
criminal behavior, deportation is in part a punitive measure, which is 
subject to constitutional proportionality principles.43  Thus, if 
removing certain types of persons is grossly disproportionate to their 
offense, it is at least unjustifiable to deploy scarce resources on their 
deportation. 
2.  The Indirect Consequences of Deportation 
That the optimal deportation regime should be priority-based is 
not a logically challenging proposition.  The more complex question 
 
 40  This is a simplification of reality that does not alter the main point: a person 
ordered removed may be precluded from returning to the United States for a period 
of 5, 10 or 20 years—or ever—depending on the grounds for his removal.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (ii)(II) (2012).  However, the length of the bar on return 
presents a very limited opportunity to calibrate sanctions, since in no event is legal 
return probable or likely. 
 41  To be sure, immigration violators are not immune to ordinary criminal law, 
which should deter unauthorized immigrants from committing crimes.  Indeed, 
there is some empirical evidence for these kinds of deterrence effects on immigrants’ 
post-entry behaviors.  See generally Butcher & Piehl, supra note 39. 
 42  See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732 
(2009) (“[A]ssigning deportation as the ubiquitous sanction renders it impossible to 
calibrate the gravity of the violation with the size of the sanction.”). 
 43  See, e.g., Michael Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. 
Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011); Angela M. Banks, Proportional 
Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1656 (2009) (“[T]he key question in determining 
whether or not a sanction is punishment is not whether it is criminal or civil, but 
whether it is remedial or punitive,” because “[p]unitive measures in both contexts 
are subject to constitutional limitations.”).  
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concerns how those priorities should be determined.  As suggested 
above, Americans are not indifferent to the characteristics of 
deportees.  Attitudes towards particular migrant types are likely to be 
informed by perceptions about the consequences of migration, which 
are inextricably linked to expectations about consequences of 
deportation.  For example, if unauthorized immigrants impose an 
onerous tax burden by educating their children in public schools, 
and the community is seriously concerned about this particular effect 
of immigration, that community might prioritize deportation of 
families with school-aged children—or, for that matter, the children 
themselves—over the deportation of childless adults.44  Building on 
that intuition, this section examines just a few of the potential 
consequences of migrant presence, and speculates about how these 
consequences might shape societal preferences for targeting 
particular migrant types for deportation (as opposed to preferences 
regarding immigration enforcement levels).  In particular, this 
discussion suggests that the indirect consequences of migration are 
not uniform across the country.  If societal determinations of more 
and less desirable types are linked to the variable consequences that 
migration produces, then considerable difficulty besets any attempt 
to create uniform nationwide priorities in a large and heterogeneous 
nation. 
i. The Uneven Spatial Impact of Migrant Presence 
Consider the most prominent consideration in public discourse 
regarding immigration, its economic impact.  Classical economic 
theory, which does not distinguish between legal and illegal 
migration, predicts that migration increases the overall economic 
productivity of the host nation, but will have redistributive 
consequences including adverse impacts on wages and employment 
of some subset of native labor.45  In particular, immigration is 
expected to lower the wages of competing native workers, but raise 
 
 44  Deporting unaccompanied children is not just a fanciful hypothetical.  See 
Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-
immigrants-face-deportation.html?pagewanted=all. 
 45  See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Immigration Restriction as Redistributive Taxation: 
Working Women and the Costs of Protectionism in the Labor Market, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 
7 (2009); TIMOTHY J. HATTON & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBAL MIGRATION AND THE 
WORLD ECONOMY: TWO CENTURIES OF POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 290 (2005); Hanson, 
supra note 22; Borjas, supra note 1, at 10, 12.  
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the wages of complementary workers.46  And there is evidence that 
the hypothesized impact occurs.47  The concern for the impact of 
immigration on native workers is already formalized in admissions 
criteria: applicants for certain employment-based visas need to show 
that their employment will not adversely impact the employment of 
U.S. workers.48  These same considerations may inform priorities for 
deportation.  In that regard, the prevailing economic wisdom is that 
low-skilled immigrants impose a greater net cost on the economy 
than high-skilled migrants because unskilled migrants do not 
complement the native labor needs, and therefore, produce a smaller 
immigrant surplus.49  Thus, insofar as economic consequences of 
migrant presence may bear on deportation priorities, unskilled 
migrants might be prioritized over the more skilled.50 
Consider next the fiscal impact of unauthorized migration.  
Unauthorized immigrants consume public goods, but they also 
contribute to tax revenue.  Most estimates of the aggregate, national 
fiscal impact of immigration conclude that, over the long term, tax 
revenues generated by immigrants, both legal and unauthorized, 
exceed the cost of the services they use.51  But, in the short term, the 
 
 46  GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION AND THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 
(1960-2000), DEP’T OF LABOR, ETA OCCASIONAL PAPER 2005–10, at 9 (2005).  
 47  See, e.g., id. at 13 (“[A]n immigration-induced 10 percent increase in the 
number of workers in each skill group . . . reduces the wage of native workers in that 
same skill group by 3.5 percent; it reduces the wage of native workers who have the 
same education but who differ in their experience by 0.7 percent; and it increases 
the wage of native workers with different educational attainment by 0.5 percent.”). 
 48  For employment based immigration, an immigrant must obtain from the 
Department of Labor a certification that (a) the job he proposes to take is one for 
which not enough qualified U.S. workers are available and (b) the immigrant’s 
employment will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the U.S. 
workers.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (2013).   
 49  See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 22, at 21; Borjas’s, supra note 46, at 13.  But see 
Gianmarco Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on Wages 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12497, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12497 (identifying potentially problematic 
assumptions behind Borjas’ methods of estimating wage impact); Chang, supra note 
45 (same). 
 50  This is not to imply that targeting unskilled migrants for deportation is a 
normatively or practically justifiable way to deal with the potentially differential 
impact of the skilled and unskilled workers on the U.S. economy.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, this Article ignores all other remedies.  But alternative 
enforcement mechanisms do exist.  See supra note 18. These may be preferable to 
deportation for some subset of violations. For an argument that taxation is preferable 
to reducing the numbers of the low-skill workers—whether by deportation or 
restrictive admission, see Chang, supra note 45.   
 51  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE 
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fiscal burden of migrants may be a concern.  The concern about the 
fiscal impact is also formalized in the ex ante admissions criteria, as 
the INA prohibits the entry of aliens if they are “likely at any time to 
become a public charge.”52 Addressing the same concerns, the 
PRWORA authorizes the states to deny or grant welfare benefits to 
immigrants, lawful and unlawful.53  These concerns are also manifest 
in public opinion, with individuals who are more exposed to the 
public-finance consequences of immigration expressing more 
negative attitudes towards it.54  Fiscal impact considerations also lead 
to the conclusion that unskilled, low-paid, or unemployed workers 
might be prioritized for deportation as they pay less in taxes, and 
perhaps, consume more in public goods than others.55 
Prioritizing low- or unskilled migrants for deportation over the 
highly skilled as a nation-wide policy would produce a certain 
geography of enforcement.  The skill levels of migrants vary across 
the country, and if this societal preference were to guide policy, more 
enforcement resources would be directed to areas with higher 
concentrations of lower-skilled migrants.  So, for example, such a 
priority system might concentrate more enforcement resources on a 
state like California, where 37.2% of immigrants (legal and illegal) 
lacked a high school diploma in 2010, and fewer resources on a state 
like New Jersey, where that figure is 20.6%. In both states, the native 
population without a high school diploma—the population likely to 
be most disadvantaged on the labor market by migrant labor—is 
comparable, at 8.9% and 8.8%, respectively.56 
Focusing on national economic or fiscal impact, however, 
obscures a great deal of variability across the nation’s territory.  It is 
not merely the characteristics of migrants that vary—for example, 
 
BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2007).   
 52  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
 53  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. 
 54  See GORDON HANSON, WHY DOES IMMIGRATION DIVIDE AMERICA?: PUBLIC FINANCE 
AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO OPEN BORDERS, Ch. 4 (2005).  
 55  A societal preference for higher skilled migrants over lower skilled ones is not 
merely a hypothetical one, with experimental survey evidence showing that people 
prefer highly skilled immigrants.  See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 37. 
 56  See MIGRATION POLICY INST., American Community Survey and Census Data on the 
Foreign Born by State (2011), http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub
/acscensus.cfm#.  Comparable data is not available specifically for the unauthorized 
or deportable population by state; for the present purposes, we may assume that the 
educational attainment of all immigrants is correlated with that of the unauthorized 
population.   
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California’s immigrants are generally less educated than New 
Jersey’s—but the very impact of migrants on the labor market itself.  At 
the sub-national level, there are well-designed studies that come to 
different conclusions regarding the effects on labor markets. Borjas’ 
analysis of Arizona, for instance, supports the notion that low-skilled 
migrants depress the wages and increase unemployment of native, 
low-skilled workers.57  By contrast, studying California’s experience 
between 1960 and 2004, Giovanni Peri found that “immigration has a 
positive effect on each single education group of native workers,” 
with “[e]ven the least educated native workers gain[ing] 1.8% of 
their real wages and college dropouts gain[ing] 7.2%.”58  These 
results, Peri argues, put in doubt the view that low-skilled migrants 
always impose an economic burden on natives: “If immigration harms 
the labor opportunities of natives, especially the least skilled ones,” 
then California, with its comparatively less educated migrant labor 
force, “was the place where these effects should have been 
particularly strong.”59 
These studies are illuminating not so much for the specific 
findings they present as for what they imply for deportation policy.  
There are several reasons why findings regarding the impact of 
migration on any outcome of interest diverge.  In part, this is due to 
different methodological choices and assumptions underlying the 
analyses.60  But in part, it is also because the impact of migration 
 
 57  See Joint Appendix, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2012 WL 406205, at 
*36–37 (Feb. 6, 2012) (reporting findings that “unauthorized aliens in the Arizona 
workforce reduced the earnings of low-skilled authorized workers in Arizona by 
4.7%,” and “increased their unemployment rate by 1.4[%]”). 
 58  GIOVANNI PERI, IMMIGRANTS’ COMPLEMENTARITIES AND NATIVE WAGES: EVIDENCE 
FROM CALIFORNIA 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12956, 
2007). 
 59  Id. at 1; see also DAVID CARD, CTR. FOR RESEARCH & ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION, HOW 
IMMIGRATION AFFECTS U.S. CITIES, DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 11/07 (2007) (finding 
that “immigration exerts a modestly positive effect on the labor market outcomes of 
most natives” across 17 metropolitan areas); David Card, The Impact of the Mariel 
Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (1990) (finding that 
the 1980 arrival of 125,000 Mariel Cubans in Miami, which suddenly increased the 
local labor supply by 7%, had no discernible effects on native wages or employment). 
 60  See, e.g., Borjas, supra note 46, at 10 (arguing that the numerous cross-sectional 
studies, which converged towards a finding of no effect on natives’ wages, were 
contrary to his results, in part because of immigrant clustering in cities with thriving 
economies—and thus, high wages—and in part because of the natives’ own out-
migration in response to migrant labor competition); Ottaviano & Peri, supra note 49 
(arguing that Borjas’s nation-level findings diverge from their own because he 
assumes that the supply of capital is fixed and that equally educated migrants and 
natives are perfect substitutes, and that these assumptions may not be justified).   
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actually differs from place to place, from one time period to another, 
and from short-run to long-run.  Indeed, economic theory identifies 
the reasons why we should expect differential impact: the effect on 
the labor market depends on the extent to which migrant labor is a 
close substitute for native labor, the mobility of native labor, and the 
mobility of capital, among other factors.61  It would be reasonable for 
some jurisdictions to conclude that the impact on the native labor 
market has been adverse, while others conclude that the impact in 
their communities has been positive.  This implies that any 
nationwide priorities we might derive from the adverse impact of 
migrants on the labor market may not accurately capture the types 
that impose the greatest costs on the native community.  While the 
deportation of a sufficient number of unskilled unauthorized 
migrants may alleviate the pressures on the natives’ employment 
prospects in Arizona (if we believe Borjas), the same results are not 
likely to follow in California (if we believe Peri). 
Likewise, the fiscal impact of migrants is uneven.  While most 
estimates of the national fiscal impact of immigration conclude that 
even unauthorized immigrants generate more revenue than they 
consume in public services, the same is usually not the case at the 
state and local levels, especially in the short run.  Because fiscal 
benefits accrue primarily to the federal government and the costs are 
borne disproportionately by state and local governments, at the sub-
federal level, the net fiscal impact on the latter is often negative.62  At 
 
 61  See GEORGE J. BORJAS ET AL., SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS, NATIVES, AND 
SKILL GROUPS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17461, 2011) 
(explaining that “the wage impact of immigration depends crucially on the elasticity 
of substitution between similarly skilled immigrants and natives and the elasticity of 
substitution between high school dropouts and graduates,” and that different 
estimates of these elasticities explain divergent findings); Chang, supra note 45, at 9 
(noting that “the demand for labor does not remain fixed when immigrants enter 
the economy,” and that adjustments in demand will condition the impact). 
 62  See HANSON, supra note 54, at 42.  This is so for a number of reasons.  First, 
“most unauthorized immigrants are prohibited from receiving many of the benefits 
that the federal government provides through Social Security and such need-based 
programs,” but state and local governments are required to provide certain services, 
in order to participate in some federal assistance programs.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
supra note 51, at 1.  Courts have also restricted the authority of state and local 
governments to deny certain public services to unauthorized immigrants.  See, e.g., 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Cal. 1997) 
(striking down California’s Proposition 187, which would have eliminated access for 
unauthorized immigrants to almost all public services).  Second, “[i]n general, state 
and local governments bear much of the cost of providing certain public services—
especially services related to education, health care, and law enforcement—to 
individuals residing in their jurisdictions.”  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 1.  
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the same time, the fiscal burden on sub-federal governments is 
variable, and this variability is not wholly a function of the size of the 
unauthorized immigrant population or of different methodological 
approaches to its calculation.63  As a Congressional Budget Office 
review of numerous state-level fiscal-impact studies found, “the 
impact in one jurisdiction cannot be generalized to other areas.”64  
This is not surprising as states and localities differ greatly in the types 
of benefits they provide, the eligibility rules for the benefits, and the 
structure of their tax revenue.65  Some jurisdictions spend more on 
educating unauthorized children than others; some spend more on 
incarcerating unauthorized migrants than others; some spend more 
on health care provisions than others.66  For example, Colorado 
estimated that it spent 1.7 times as much on providing medical care 
for unauthorized migrants as it did on incarcerating them in 2006.67  
By contrast, Texas estimated that it spent more than twice as much on 
incarcerating unauthorized immigrants as it did on their medical 
care in 2006.68  Because of such differences, as well as differences in 
 
On the benefit side, by contrast, unauthorized migrants provide more federal tax 
revenue (from Social Security and federal income taxes) relative to state or local tax 
revenue. 
 63  Although such differences certainly matter, see WILLIAM K. JAEGER, POTENTIAL 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN OREGON OF IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY “NO MATCH” IMMIGRATION RULES, 35 (2008), available at 
http://immigrationworksusa.org/uploaded/file 
/CWO%20Economic%20Study%20-%20OSU%20-%20Jaeger.pdf (demonstrating 
inconsistent results of fiscal impact of the exodus of the entire unauthorized worker 
population “appear to be due to the distinction between a static analysis (estimated 
current tax contributions of undocumented immigrants) and a dynamic analysis 
(estimated change in revenues if undocumented immigrants departed)”). 
 64  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 5. 
 65  For a discussion of representative studies of fiscal impact, see JAEGER, supra 
note 63, at 9 (discussing results of studies from Colorado, Missouri, and Texas); 
National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/state-studies-on-fiscal-impacts.aspx (summarizing findings of many 
state-level fiscal impact studies). 
 66  E.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that Minnesota 
estimates that it spent about $8,400 per child to educate unauthorized immigrant 
children in 2003–04, while New Mexico estimates that number for the same year to 
be around $7,280 per head); OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=86 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) 
(noting that Texas pays $12,000 per inmate to incarcerate criminal aliens, while 
California pays $34,000 for the same).  
 67  RICH JONES & ROBIN BAKER, COSTS OF FEDERALLY MANDATED SERVICES TO 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN COLORADO 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.bellpolicy.org/PUBS/IssBrf/2006/06ImmigCosts.pdf (expenditures of 
$31.3 million and $18 million, respectively). 
 68  See CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, TEXAS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 
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tax revenue, the characteristics of the greatest-public-goods consumer 
may differ from state to state. 
Consider now the perceived consequences of unauthorized 
migration for crime.  States and localities that adopt restrictionist 
measures often point to the crimes committed by migrants as one of 
the justifications for the measures.69  Unlike concerns about the labor 
market and public expenditures, for which there is theoretical and 
some empirical support, the weight of empirical research indicates 
that late twentieth-century immigrants are less likely to commit 
crimes than the native born,70 and that higher concentrations of 
immigrants at the aggregate level do not correlate with higher crime 
rates.71  This is the case for immigrants in general and unauthorized 
 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE 
STATE BUDGET AND ECONOMY 1, 9, 14 (2006), available at 
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/undocumented.pdf 
(expenditures of $130.6 million and $58 million, respectively). 
 69  See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 § 2 (Sept. 21, 2006) (finding that 
“[i]llegal immigration leads to higher crime rates”); Proposition 187 §1, 1994 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (Nov. 8, 1994) (overturned by a federal court) (claiming 
“[t]he people of California . . . have suffered and are suffering economic hardship 
caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state,” and “personal injury and 
damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state”) (quoted in 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 787 (C.D. Cal. 
1995)). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 507 
(2007) (describing the common perception that immigration causes crime and 
citing studies demonstrating a lack of such a link). 
 70  In the U.S., the proposition that late twentieth-century immigrants are less 
likely to offend than the native-born is very well-supported.  See, e.g., Robert J. 
Sampson, Op-Ed., Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals: Is Increased Immigration Behind the 
Drop in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A27 (describing results of a study that 
“revealed that Latin American immigrants are less violent and less likely than the 
second and third generations to commit crimes even when they live in dense 
communities with high rates of poverty”); Ruben G. Rubmaut et al., Debunking the 
Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young 
Men, Invited Address to the “Immigration Enforcement and Civil Liberties: The Role 
of Local Police” National Conference, Police Foundation 2 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1877365 (“[S]tudies, including official crime 
statistics and victimization surveys since the early 1990s, data from the last three 
decennial censuses, national and regional surveys . . .and investigations carried out 
by major government commissions over the past century, have shown . . . that 
immigration is associated with lower crime rates . . . .”); Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & 
Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, THE 
NATURE OF CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 485, 496 (Gary LaFree et al. 
eds., 2000) (“The major finding of a century of research on immigration and crime is 
that . . . immigrants nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than native groups.”). 
 71  The question of macro-level impact is more complex and has been the subject 
of fewer studies, although most find either a negative or no relationship between 
migrant concentration and crime.  See, e.g., John M. MacDonald et al., The Effects of 
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migrants specifically.72  But some categories of crime may be potential 
byproducts of unauthorized migration: the process of illegal entry 
itself, for example, feeds the human trafficking industry.  And 
because criminal acts are viewed as socially undesirable, it is 
reasonable to use criminal activity as a criterion for separating 
desirable from undesirable individuals without regard to the macro-
level effects on crime rates.  These concerns, formalized in 
admissions criteria, constitute formal deportation grounds, and form 
the basis for current federal deportation priorities.73 
The relationship between unauthorized migration and crime 
also differs across the country.  Contrary to nationwide or cross-
sectional studies, the experience in specific parts of the country 
suggests a higher share of unauthorized migrants among convicted 
criminals.  Maricopa County, for example, claims that unauthorized 
immigrants are overrepresented among the felon population relative 
to their share of the Arizona population.74  The threats from crime 
 
Immigrant Concentration on Changes in Neighborhood Crime Rates, 29 J. QUANT. CRIM. 191, 
193 (2012) (finding that a higher concentration of immigrants is associated with 
“greater than expected reductions” in index and violent crimes across Los Angeles 
neighborhoods 2000–05); Lesley Williams Reid et al., The Immigration-Crime 
Relationship: Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 757, 772–74 
(2005) (finding that “the greater the relative size of the recent foreign-born 
population,” the lower the homicide rate across a representative sample of 150 U.S. 
metropolitan areas in 2000); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Cross-city 
Evidence on the Relationship Between Immigration and Crime, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
457 (1998) (finding no relationship between the percent of immigrants in the 
population and the crime rate across a sample of metropolitan areas between 1980 
and 1990).   
 72  See, e.g., Ruben G. Rumbaut, Undocumented Immigration and Rates of Crime and 
Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical Realities, in POLICE FOUNDATION 119, 126, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877365 (finding 
that “the lowest incarceration rates among Latin American immigrants are seen for 
the least educated groups, who are also the groups who account for the majority of 
the undocumented: the Salvadorans[,] Guatemalans[], and the Mexicans”). 
 73  Criminal activity is a basis for both inadmissibility and a ground of 
deportability.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2013) (removal on the basis of 
crimes of moral turpitude); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (2013) (removal on the basis 
of aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2013) (crime related to high-
speed flight from an immigration checkpoint); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2013) 
(controlled substance violations).  For a discussion of federal priorities, see infra Part 
III.A. 
 74 Joint Appendix, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2012 WL 406205, at *299 
(Feb. 6, 2012) (“Arizona’s population is comprised of approximately 9% illegal 
immigrants, yet 21.8% of felonies sentenced in Maricopa County Superior Court are 
committed by illegal immigrants.”); Stephen A. Camarota & Jessica M. Vaughan, 
Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Issue, BACKGROUNDER (Cent. for 
Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2009, at 16 (estimating that 
unauthorized aliens comprise 8.9% of the population and are responsible for 21.8% 
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connected with unauthorized migration vary across the country: in 
particular, border states bear the burden of immigration-related 
crimes, such as smuggling and human trafficking.75  Likewise, some 
areas struggle with a heavier presence of gangs with large numbers of 
unauthorized alien members, and other areas do not.76  As Peter 
Schuck’s synthesis of all available data shows, deportable non-citizens 
represent a highly variable share of the incarcerated population, and 
the composition of the incarcerated non-citizen population differs 
across jurisdictions.77  For jurisdictions with a serious migration-linked 
crime problem, targeting criminal aliens above all other types—
perhaps including those who have not committed very serious 
crimes—may be justifiable. 
By contrast, the arrival of immigrants to some communities has 
had salutary effects on public safety and neighborhood social 
cohesion.  Researchers have argued that the unexpected great 
American crime decline of the 1990s is not unrelated to the arrival of 
Latino and Asian immigrants.78  The introduction of these 
 
of the felonies in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix).  Such analyses should 
be treated with caution, since localities like Maricopa that make aggressive use of 
arrests to apprehend immigration violators are likely to disproportionately arrest 
members of this group. 
 75  See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 9 (noting the comparatively 
high cost of law enforcement activities in the border counties of California, Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Texas); Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Arizona v. United States, No. 
11-182, 2012 WL 416748 (Feb. 6, 2012) (documenting the disproportionate burden 
on Arizona created by the federal enforcement focus on the California and Texas 
borders, resulting in a “funneling of an increasing tide of illegal border crossings 
into Arizona,” which are accompanied by “drug and human smuggling”). 
 76  For example, the notorious gang MS-13 is heavily concentrated in certain 
parts of the country.  Although the common description of that group as an “alien 
gang” is not wholly accurate, see Jennifer Chacon, Whose Community Shield? Examining 
the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 327–29 
(2007), it certainly has some unauthorized alien involvement.  The “18th Street” 
association of criminal cliques, with an estimated membership of 30,000 to 50,000, 
operates across the country, in at least 44 cities.  Only in California, however, are 
“approximately 80 percent of the gang’s members . . . illegal aliens from Mexico and 
Central America.”  NATIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, NATIONAL GANG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT, at 23 (2009), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services 
/publications/national-gang-threat-assessment-2009-pdf. 
 77  Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons: Rethinking an 
Anachronistic Policy, App’x 1–2 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 266, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805931.  
 78  See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 70, at A27 (arguing that the drop in crime that 
began in the United States in the early 1990s can be partially explained by increases 
in immigration).  Systematic longitudinal studies have lent support to this 
connection.  See, e.g., Jacob I. Stowell et al., Immigration and the Recent Violent Crime 
Drop in the United States: A Pooled, Cross-sectional Time-series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas, 
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
132 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
newcomers, with their “tight-knit families, economic 
entrepreneurship, and collective efficacy,” may help explain why 
crime declined most steeply in major immigrant destination cities.79  
Overall, reviews of recent literature have concluded that, “[f]rom the 
limited research available, it appears that the concentration of 
immigration indirectly promotes reductions in crime and violence.”80  
For jurisdictions where immigrant presence palpably benefits the 
host communities in this way, targeting criminal aliens for 
deportation is not costless.  The indirect consequences of 
deportation in this regard are not simply mirror images of the 
consequences of forbearing from deportation.  Many researchers—
and police departments themselves—have pointed out that aggressive 
immigration enforcement aimed at deportation, especially when 
carried out with participation of the local law enforcement agencies 
(“LEAs”), also undermines the capacity of the LEAs for crime 
control.81  Effective criminal law enforcement relies on the voluntary 
cooperation of the community with the police,82 and the fear that 
police may be acting as immigration law enforcers makes immigrants 
less willing to report crimes and cooperate with investigations.83 
 
47 CRIMINOLOGY 889, 889 (2009) (finding support for the hypothesis that “the broad 
reductions in violent crime during recent years are partially attributable to increases 
in immigration”). 
 79  Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of 
Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
489, 492 (2010).  
 80  David S. Kirk & John H. Laub, Neighborhood Change and Crime in the Modern 
Metropolis, 39 CRIME & JUST. 441, 484 (2010); see also Graham C. Ousey & Charis E. 
Kubrin, Exploring the Connection Between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in U.S. 
Cities, 1980–2000, 56 SOC. PROBS. 447, 454–65 (2009) (reviewing 11 aggregate-level 
quantitative studies on the immigration-crime relationship, and showing that only 
two studies find any positive relationship between a subset of immigrants and some 
categories of crime). 
 81  DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, POLICE AND 
IMMIGRATION: HOW CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE 
CHALLENGES 43 (2010), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library
/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf. 
 82  See generally WESLEY SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE (2003); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE (2010). 
 83  See, e.g., David Kirk et al., The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant 
Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety? 641 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 80–81 (2012) (cautioning that “increased and harsh 
enforcement of laws may undermine the ability of the police to control crime by 
reducing the willingness of immigrants to report crimes and cooperate with the 
police in criminal investigations”); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z. 
Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim 
Americans, 44 L. & Society Rev. 365 (2010) (offering evidence that the trust required 
for cooperation is eroded in presence of (Muslim) immigrants’ fear that any contact 
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As Peter Schuck points out, whether the risk of alienating 
immigrant communities really compromises the efficacy of crime 
control depends on the magnitude of that effect at the margin.84  
Schuck is right that the inferences to be drawn for immigration 
enforcement depend on the magnitude of the various effects 
attributed to enforcement actions, balancing the gains to crime 
control from targeting criminal aliens against the losses due to 
community alienation and resource diversion.  There is no reason to 
suppose that weighing the costs and benefits of deportation for crime 
control would yield the same result for every community.  Just as 
migrant involvement in crime varies across jurisdictions, so too the 
levels of cooperation with police vary across communities,85 as does 
the impact of law enforcement on the willingness to cooperate and 
the overall efficacy of crime control.86  While in some settings, 
targeting even minor criminal violators would reasonably be expected 
to lower crime rates, in others, the counter-productive effects of such 
targeting would probably overwhelm any boost to public order. 
The consideration of the spatially heterogeneous impact of 
unauthorized presence on the native labor market, public 
expenditures, and crime should convey skepticism about the 
possibility of a single optimal priority scheme.  Peoples’ preferences 
about deportation are likely to be correlated with the consequences 
of migrant presence that are most keenly experienced by them.  If 
social preferences were to be reflected in the identification of the 
least and most socially desirable types, the results would unlikely be 
 
with the police may lead to deportation); Hoffmaster, supra note 81, at 4–7 
(describing the New Haven PD’s finding that immigrants were more often victims of 
crimes than perpetrators, and that diminishing their fears of deportation is far more 
helpful to the PD’s crime control efforts than targeting even criminal aliens for arrest 
in order to hand them over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.)); 
THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CTR. FOR SURVEY 
RESEARCH, EVALUATION STUDY OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY’S ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY 125 (2010), available at http://www.pwcgov.org/government
/bocs/Documents/13188.pdf (finding a substantial drop in Hispanic respondents’ 
satisfaction with the police in the wake of entering into an immigration enforcement 
agreement with the federal government). 
 84  Schuck, supra note 10, at 72–74. 
 85  Compare Kirk et al., supra note 83 (demonstrating a high level of cooperation 
and trust among non-citizens relative to natives in New York neighborhoods), with 
Hoffmaster, supra note 81, xvii (finding that, on the basis of case studies, “in some 
communities,” migrants are “reluctant to engage with the police on crime prevention 
and community-building,” owing in part to immigrants’ negative experiences with 
law enforcement in their own countries). 
 86  See, e.g., Hoffmaster, supra note 81, xvii (noting that “no two communities are 
affected by immigration in the same way”). 
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uniform nationally. 
3. The Necessity for Subjective Political Judgment 
It is not merely the spatially uneven consequences of migration 
that make a singular set of nation-wide priorities unlikely to capture 
the costs and benefits of migrant presence.  Identifying the more and 
less desirable types in a given jurisdiction is complicated by the 
multiplicity of potential criteria for judging desirability of types, and 
by the necessity of subjective, political judgment regarding the trade-
offs.  For this reason, the suggestion that the federal government 
merely incorporate the variable consequences of migrant presence 
into enforcement policy would not fully address the problem.87 
The multiple criteria according to which judgments about the 
relative desirability of different types of immigrants might be made 
necessitate trade-offs in setting enforcement priorities.  Public 
debates and research on the consequences of immigration 
enforcement and unauthorized migrant presence range widely 
beyond the economic, fiscal, and crime impacts discussed above.  
Notably, there is a host of concerns about the impact of migrant 
presence, or their expulsion, on the social fabric of the community.  
Some worry about the possibility that a high concentration of 
immigrants undermines social cohesion, and others worry about 
damage done by removal of particular individuals on their families 
and communities.88  Some worry about a loss of the American 
national culture or identity that accompanies massive changes in the 
ethno-demographic make-up of the population,89 and others warn 
about the erosion of civil rights and the specter of racial profiling 
that accompany efforts to rid the country of unauthorized visitors.90  
 
 87  See Adam Cox & Eric Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1285, 1341 (2012) (addressing that suggestion in passing as a potential way to redress 
the old principal-agent problem while retaining federal access to superior sub-federal 
information about deportable individuals); Schuck, supra note 77, at 8 (proposing a 
reform of legal constraints on early deportations of convicted aliens, and suggesting 
that the costs and benefits of such are something only the federal government can 
figure out). 
 88  See, e.g., AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf 
(examining the consequences of parental detention and deportation on children).   
 89  See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004).  
 90  See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004) (“[T]he permanent involvement of 
state and local police in routine immigration enforcement raises the further risk of 
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Some fear out-migration of the native population will accompany the 
arrival of non-citizens, and others predict that only immigrant in-
migration can reverse decades of population loss in declining towns 
and rural areas.91  The costs and benefits of deportation on the one 
hand, and of abiding a large unauthorized migrant presence on the 
other, which have been offered up in public discourse and scholarly 
debate, are legion. 
How much weight to attach to any of the potential consequences 
of deporting or forbearing, and whether to consider particular 
consequences at all, are not questions that may be reduced to a 
solvable optimization problem.  These questions do not lend 
themselves to technocratic accounting of quantifiable costs and 
benefits.  The potential of depressed wages of native workers or the 
burdensome education expenditures may carry great weight in a 
populous, budget-strapped jurisdiction with high unemployment.  
That jurisdiction might target unauthorized workers thought to 
contribute to local unemployment or families with school-aged 
children.  The same costs may not carry so much weight for cities or 
towns that are facing long-term economic decline and population 
loss and looking to immigration to reverse these perilous trends.92  
Such a jurisdiction may prioritize only the most serious criminals.  A 
deportation regime attentive to the most serious consequences of 
migration where these consequences are most immediately 
 
racial profiling and selective immigration enforcement beyond moments of real or 
perceived national threat.”). 
 91  Patrick J. Carr et al., Immigration and the Changing Social Fabric of American Cities: 
Can Immigration Save Small-Town America? Hispanic Boomtowns and the Uneasy Path to 
Renewal, 641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 38; STEVE TOBOCMAN, GLOBAL 
DETROIT, SHORT REPORT 2 (2010) (setting out Detroit’s development strategy and 
stating that “nothing is more powerful to remaking Detroit as a center of innovation, 
entrepreneurship and population growth, than embracing and increasing immigrant 
populations and the entrepreneurial culture and global connections that they bring 
and deliver,” which “could include both documented and undocumented 
residents”), available at http://www.thecenterformichigan.net/wp-content/uploads
/2010/05/GLOBAL_DETROIT.pdf. 
 92  See Carr et al., supra note 91, at 40–44 (describing the revival of moribund 
economies and boost to declining populations delivering by immigration into small 
agricultural Midwestern towns); Carol Morello & Luz Lazo, Baltimore Puts Out Welcome 
Mat for Immigrants, Hoping to Stop Population Decline, WASH. POST, July 24, 2012, 
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com 
/2012-07-24/local/35487100_1_immigration-status-immigration-checks-immigrant-
population (reporting on Baltimore’s policy of attracting immigrants to reverse 
decades of population loss even though Baltimore’s unemployment rate is already 
high, including the Mayor’s order prohibiting police and social agencies from asking 
anyone about immigration status). 
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
136 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
experienced should accommodate both of those choices. 
C.  Who Should Decide Whom to Deport? 
1. Decentralizing Priority Setting 
The character of the costs and benefits of migrant presence and 
deportation addressed in the prior section has important 
implications for the third question defining the deportation regime: 
who should decide how many and which types of immigrants should 
be deported?  The implications of the costs and benefits of 
immigration for “immigration federalism” generally have been noted 
in immigration scholarship.  The fact that the costs and benefits of 
particular enforcement policies are not borne by the same level of 
government is often cited as problematic.  From this fact, however, 
different scholars draw opposing conclusions.  Some have criticized 
federal exclusivity in the realm of enforcement, as well as other 
immigration-related matters, on the grounds that the benefits of 
continuing migrant presence (e.g., tax revenue) are federal while 
costs (e.g., public goods provision) are local.93  That line of argument 
suggests that the federal government would not adequately account 
for local costs in choosing immigration enforcement policies, and 
thus, states (and localities) should have a greater role in immigration 
related matters. 
Others have criticized sub-federal participation in immigration 
regulation generally, and enforcement in particular, on the grounds 
that states and localities do not bear the full costs of their policies.94  
When a jurisdiction adopts aggressive enforcement policies, it 
externalizes part of the cost to the federal government and other 
jurisdictions: the federal government bears the administrative costs of 
processing people who sub-federal authorities insist on placing in 
deportation proceedings, and restrictionist policies drive the 
unauthorized migrants across borders into other jurisdictions.95  The 
 
 93  See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 10, at 70; Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of 
Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
459, 460-61 (2008). For a discussion on the asymmetry of fiscal impact, see supra note 
65; indeed, in the 1990s, the fiscal asymmetry gave rise to a series of unsuccessful 
lawsuits by six states against the federal government, seeking reimbursement, see 
Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 
104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997); 
New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996); Padavan v. United States, 82 
F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).  
 94 See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9. 
 95  See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1714–19; see also Margaret Hu, 
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conclusion that follows from this line of argument is that sub-federal 
governments should not engage in any immigration enforcement 
(and, according to some, much immigration-related regulation at 
all).96 
Though no level of government may be perfectly competent and 
properly motivated to enforce the immigration laws, there is room for 
improvement over the status quo of de jure federal exclusivity.  Given 
the character and the distribution of the direct and indirect costs of 
deportation, the federal government is better situated to determine 
the answer to the first question defining the deportation regime—the 
“how many” question—while sub-federal governments are better 
situated to inform the answer to the second question of what types 
should be prioritized for deportation. 
The federal government bears the direct benefits and costs of 
deportation.  It is the federal government that reaps the direct rule-
of-law benefits of deportations because it is violations of federal law 
that are being sanctioned.97  More importantly, although state and 
local authorities often apprehend immigration violators, by and 
large, the federal government bears the enforcement costs for each 
person placed in deportation proceedings.  That the federal 
government has exclusive power of formal removal is a 
constitutionally required, immutable feature of the deportation 
system.98  Because the federal government must bear the direct costs 
of deportation, it is best situated to determine how many people 
should be deported. 
The direct costs and benefits of deportation, however, do not 
translate into helpful enforcement priorities.  One inference that 
may be made is that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
 
Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 596 (2012) (arguing that states 
insisting on aggressive participation in immigration enforcement “reverse-
commandeer” federal resources “that would not otherwise be committed”). 
 96  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1714–19. 
 97  Although sub-federal officials appear to care about violations of federal 
immigration law a great deal, it is far more likely that their dissatisfaction is related to 
the indirect consequences of federal enforcement patterns.  If Congress were to pass 
universal amnesty tomorrow, making all current violators into legal residents, those 
who pushed for greater enforcement would not likely deem the problem solved, 
although the federal rule of law interest would be extinguished. 
 98  See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the 
entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to 
Congress.”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control 
immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal 
government.”).  
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(“ICE”) should target those individuals who are easiest—cheapest—
to locate.  That approach might make the deportation regime more 
efficient, but ease of detection in itself does not correspond to any 
meaningful quality we would associate with the least desirable types.  
Another inference is that ICE should target repeat violators and 
absconders—that is, individuals who in some sense inflict greater 
harms to the rule of law.  That is a more germane criterion.  Were it 
the only relevant factor determining priority for deportation 
however, it would ignore some of the most keenly experienced 
consequences of unauthorized migration, which may have little to do 
with the fact of repeated violations. 
This is not to claim that the public or public officials are 
unconcerned about the sheer fact of violation of immigration law.  
But vindicating the rule of law alone is insufficient to foreclose 
consideration of all other characteristics of migrants that bear on 
their social desirability.  The findings of a recent study by Hainmuller 
and Hopkins are instructive in this regard.  The authors tested the 
relative influence of nine immigrant attributes in driving 
respondents’ support or opposition to the immigrants’ admission in 
the U.S.99  They found that a violation of immigration laws (prior 
unauthorized entry) does make hypothetical immigrants less likely to 
be chosen for admission by respondents, but that its effect was 
smaller than a number of other factors, such as having no plans to 
work, not speaking English, or being a native of one of the few 
strongly disfavored origin countries.100  If the preferences Hainmuller 
and Hopkins find for immigration admissions are indicative of the 
preferences people harbor regarding deportation, then the case for 
prioritizing solely on the basis of the gravity of the legal violation is 
undermined. 
If we believe that at some relevant level of abstraction there is a 
socially optimal priority scheme that identifies the least desired, or 
highest-net cost types, then identifying priorities requires weighing 
the relatively indirect consequences of deporting or forbearing.  And 
the federal government is not well positioned to identify and assess 
most of the indirect costs and benefits associated with enforcement.  
That is so because, as the discussion above demonstrates, the indirect 
 
 99  Hainmuller & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 1 (explaining that the “experiment 
puts . . . [American] citizens in the position of immigration policymakers and asks 
them to decide between pairs of immigrants applying for [naturalization,]” and 
“identify which immigrant attributes make immigrants more or less likely to be 
granted admission”). 
 100  Id. at 17–20. 
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consequences are experienced chiefly at the local level and are 
spatially variable.  It is not wholly surprising that, in fact, the 
considerations the federal government takes into account in setting 
priorities for deportation exclude many of deep concern to their 
citizens.101 
There is no ready hierarchy among the indirect consequences of 
deportation and migrant presence, whence a priority system might 
spring.  As observed above, decisions concerning enforcement 
priorities entail weighing the costs and benefits of deporting any 
particular type and evaluating trade-offs entailed in targeting certain 
types and forbearing with regard to others.  Perhaps with the 
exception of prioritizing the most serious security and criminal 
threats, an exceedingly small fraction of all deportable individuals,102 
these decisions would differ from community to community. This 
makes a singular, nation-wide priority scheme inadequate to the task.  
Nor could these decisions be derived in some way from ascertainable 
costs and benefits of unauthorized migration.  This makes a singular 
national decision-maker inadequate to the task.  One could not simply 
examine state budgets, for example, and determine the optimal 
priority ranking for immigrant types for each state.103  Setting 
priorities calls for normative and political judgments that are 
responsive to the variable circumstances and preferences of 
communities experiencing the impact of unauthorized immigration 
and the deportation of migrants from their midst. 
Immigration scholars offer arguments grounded in similar 
considerations when they seek to justify robust sub-federal 
participation in regulating and integrating immigrants (as opposed 
to enforcing the immigration law).  Because the impact of migration 
varies spatially, Rodriguez and others have concluded that there are 
compelling functional reasons for states and localities to engage in 
policy-making concerning language education, job training, day labor 
centers, “sanctuary” laws, and so on.104  Similarly, Cox and Posner 
 
 101  See infra Part III.A. 
 102 See infra note 210. 
 103  For this reason, the problem is not amenable to the kinds of remedies 
suggested by the fiscal federalism literature.  See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Introduction to the Economics of Federalism 7 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper No. LE06-001, 2006) (discussing the literature on the use of 
grants to solve the spillover problems created by fiscal federalism).   
 104  See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 608–09 (“The effects of immigration are 
felt differently in different parts of the country, and the disruption immigration 
causes, as well as the viability of different immigration strategies, will vary, in part, 
according to the health of local economies and the existence of ethnic social 
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argue that forms of partial delegation of authority pertaining to 
immigration to “agents” (private and governmental) are justified on 
informational grounds.  Just like “[e]mployers can often do a far 
superior job of evaluating the productivity of foreign workers,” and 
family members “are generally in a better position . . . to evaluate the 
capability of potential migrants to integrate after arrival,” “states have 
more information about local immigration conditions . . . than does 
the federal government.”105 
Similar considerations support the conclusion that sub-federal 
governments can better identify priorities for deportation.  That 
conclusion does not depend on any particularly optimistic theory of 
state or local democratic politics.  The lower levels of government are 
better positioned to formulate deportation priorities not simply 
because sub-federal governments might be more “democratic” or 
more responsive to their constituents.  They are better positioned 
because of their superior access to informational inputs required for 
assessing the indirect consequences of migrant presence of greatest 
concern to their constituents and the unique capacity for making 
political choices about incommensurate goals.  Beyond gathering 
information about the local impact of migration, all that is needed is 
that there be some mechanisms for sub-federal officials to elicit or 
discern constituents’ attitudes towards consequences of unauthorized 
immigration and some mechanisms of accountability that would 
reflect the expression of opinions about priority decisions.106 
 
networks.”). 
 105  Cox & Posner, supra note 87, at 1289. It is worth emphasizing that empirical 
studies, such as that authored by Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan, which show that local immigration policies are unrelated to 
measurable “regionally specific, immigration-induced policy concerns” do not 
necessarily undermine functional arguments for devolution. Immigration Federalism: A 
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2080 (2013).  We should not expect that 
observable factors, such as the growth of the foreign-born population or poverty 
levels, accurately predict local responses to immigration because different 
communities are liable to accord variable weights to the same demographic, 
economic, or cultural consequences of immigrant presence. 
 106  The information-based advantage is certainly augmented if state and local 
governments are in fact more responsive to their constituents’ preferences than the 
national government.  See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice 
(N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 13625, 2009), available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13625/1/MPRA_paper_13625.pdf (reviewing the 
basic theories why smaller governments are likely to be more accountable to their 
constituents than the national government); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A 
DIALOGUE 91–106, 139 (Northwestern Univ. Press 1995) (stating the same).  For an 
argument that at least some branches of sub-national governments are in fact less 
responsive and less accountable to voter preferences, see David Schleicher, Why Is 
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2.  Addressing Objections to Decentralization 
There are thus functional reasons to involve sub-federal 
authorities in the process of determining which types of immigrants 
to prioritize for deportation.  That is not to say functional 
justifications for centralization are absent, or unworthy of 
consideration.  The most common objection made to other modes of 
state and local participation in immigration enforcement is that it 
invokes spillover effects.  This objection, however, does not apply with 
as much force to priority-setting. 
The spillover-based argument raises legitimate concerns for 
other kinds of state and local enforcement measures.  For example, 
Cunningham-Parmeter argues that states experimenting with 
“enforcement-based” restrictionist measures “encourage the mass 
exodus of unauthorized immigrants,” thereby “export[ing] to their 
sister states the economic damage they claim illegal immigration 
causes.”107  Furthermore, these measures “demand additional 
resources from the federal government to assist with verifying the 
status of suspects” whom the state or local officials would like to 
deport.108 
With regard to the spillovers in the form of “self-deporting” 
unauthorized immigrants, priority-setting poses no special problems, 
at least in principle.  Even if we count the unauthorized immigrants 
themselves as an externality, whether it is positive or negative will 
depend on the priorities and preferences of the jurisdiction that the 
immigrants enter.109  Consider what would theoretically follow if each 
state set and publicized deportation priorities, which Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) officials then followed in their decisions 
to commence deportation proceedings.  Mass exodus or self-
deportation is hypothesized to occur when a jurisdiction engages in 
aggressive enforcement that raises the probability of deportation for 
 
There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law, 23 J. LAW 
& POL. 419 (2007) (arguing that local, city-level legislatures are in fact poor at 
“translating voter preferences into government policy,” and do “not provide voters 
with the ability to replace incumbents with opponents with different views and to 
have their views represented in local policies”). 
 107  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1692. 
 108  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1678; see also Rodriguez, supra note 10, 
at 627 (discussing the possibility of overtaxing the federal system by local requests for 
status verification).  
 109  See Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 639 (“Immigrants are different in kind from 
the paradigmatic externality example of pollution, largely because the presence of 
(even unauthorized) immigrants may be welcomed (or at least tolerated) in some 
communities but not in others.”). 
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all or most migrants.  If one state’s deportation priorities were 
credible, in principle, only the prioritized types would be driven 
out.110  If they chose to exit, they would choose a destination state with 
a better enforcement climate for their type.  The influx of migrants, 
whose deportation the destination state does not value sufficiently 
highly, may not make this a positive spillover.  However, it does mean 
that the particular costs these migrants might impose are less 
objectionable to the destination state than they are to the origin state.  
Thus, if state participation in priority setting would impose costs on 
other states, these would be less pronounced compared to the costs 
created by the kinds of aggressive enforcement measures aimed at 
complete self-deportation that states currently undertake.  As will be 
illustrated in the discussion of the status quo in Part III, existing 
modes of state involvement are largely limited to measures intended 
to trigger deportation or self-deportation across the board at one 
extreme and sanctuary non-cooperation policies on the other.  In a 
universe where jurisdictions legislate and/or enforce their laws in a 
manner that makes them either “hostile” or “receptive” to 
immigrants, unauthorized migrants would flee hostile jurisdictions 
for receptive ones.  This, as Peter Spiro has argued, is not the worst 
state of affairs, as it is preferable “to be driven from a hostile 
California to a receptive New York than to be shut out of the United 
States altogether.”111  As has been emphasized throughout this Article, 
however, few jurisdictions are entirely hostile or receptive.  As a 
general matter, most care about their immigrants.  If every state 
articulated its enforcement priorities, sorting would better match 
immigrant types to communities receptive to, or at least tolerant of, 
their type. 
With regard to costs externalized via pressure on federal 
 
 110  The notion that localities are capable of communicating their enforcement 
priorities to the immigrant communities is not purely speculative.  For example, 
when Prince William County entered into a 287(g) partnership with the federal 
government, which allowed its officers to carry out some immigration enforcement 
functions, see infra note 139 and accompanying text, the police department issued 
bilingual materials and conducted hundreds of briefings, to dispel the impression 
that the program represents an all-out campaign to apprehend all deportable aliens, 
and to explain that only criminal illegal immigrants would be targeted.  See Randy 
Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration 
Enforcement 3 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-
divergence.pdf.   
 111  Spiro, supra note 11, at 1635–36; see generally Hills, supra note 106 (explaining 
that exit-based arguments about federalism and inter-jurisdictional competition rely 
on the assumptions that people “flee[ing] oppressive subnational jurisdictions” have 
“some non-predatory jurisdiction to which they can flee”). 
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enforcement resources, it is unclear whether decentralizing priority 
setting would alter sub-federal demands on these resources.  Priority 
setting would not give states or localities any more control over how 
many immigrants are placed in deportation proceedings, and the cap 
on this figure would continue to be determined by the federal 
government.  As suggested in the following section, states and 
localities place pressures on federal resources in part because it is the 
only avenue of influence open to them.  If sub-federal priorities are 
honored in deportation decisions, incentives for states to either flood 
ICE with requests or to refuse to hand over individuals ICE requests 
may be diminished. 
Other considerations might be contemplated in favor of 
centralized control.  For present purposes, it is worth noting only that 
values generally invoked for federal authority have no obvious 
implications for the question of priority-setting.  Centralized federal 
power is said to be appropriate to ensure uniformity.112  In this 
context, an interest in uniformity appears absent.  On the contrary, as 
suggested above, any reasonable attempt to prioritize the least socially 
desirable types for deportation cannot rest on a nationally uniform 
scheme.  Centralized power is sometimes justified on the basis of its 
superior record of protecting civil rights.113  An interest in protecting 
the rights of the nation’s non-citizens is compelling; however, as 
several scholars have noted, it is not clear that the federal 
government is better at protecting non-citizens’ civil rights than are 
sub-federal governments.114  Moreover, insofar as sub-national actors 
do present a threat to the civil rights of immigrants or minorities, this 
threat is independent of which authority sets deportation priorities.  
Michael Olivas articulates the nature of the problem vividly: “We do 
not want . . . fifty immigration policies. We certainly do not want and 
cannot tolerate hundreds, allowing liberal Santa Fe, New Mexico to 
carve out a ‘sanctuary’ while Hazleton, Pennsylvania or Norcross, 
Georgia get to run every bilingual speaker or dark-complexioned 
person out of town after sundown.”115  As Part III will demonstrate, 
 
 112  See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 9, at 53–54 (arguing against state and local 
involvement in immigration matters because “[w]e do not want fifty foreign affairs 
policies, or fifty immigration policies”). 
 113  See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 9, at 526 (arguing that devolution of authority to 
sub-national levels threatens equal protection and civil rights of immigrants).  
 114  See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 13, at 831 (arguing that on the basis of recent 
experience, “it is by no means clear that the national government will better protect 
the interests of non-citizens”); Schuck, supra note 10, at 60 (stating the same). 
 115  Olivas, supra note 9, at 53. 
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the problem Olivas describes is to some extent unavoidable.  Even 
without formal authority over the key dimensions of the deportation 
regime, state and local actors have ample opportunity to control the 
fates and threaten the rights of non-citizens in their territories. There 
is little reason to believe that these problems would be aggravated by 
allowing sub-national officials to weigh in on priority setting. 
III. THE DEPORTATION REGIME UNDER THE STATUS QUO 
Part II of this Article set out a functional argument for sub-
federal participation in setting priorities for deportation, on the 
grounds that uniform priorities are a crude way of identifying the 
least desirable types of immigration violators.  Part III will review how 
the deportation regime has been functioning on the ground and 
demonstrates that sub-federal subversion of federal de jure control 
makes a uniform, centrally-set priority scheme unrealizable in 
practice.  The deportation regime has been shaped by a de jure 
federal exclusivity with regard to both the number and type of 
migrants targeted for deportation.  Despite being legally disabled 
from participating in priority-setting, sub-federal authorities have 
been employing every tool at their disposal to undermine federal 
control.  What results is a federalist stand-off, in which sub-federal 
actors influence the level of enforcement within their jurisdictions, 
but neither federal nor sub-federal authorities can conform 
deportation patterns to their priorities. 
A. De Jure Federal Monopoly on Priority Setting 
Although the notion that immigration enforcement should be 
prioritized is not new,116 only relatively recently did the DHS publicize 
a priority system that went beyond simply calling for a focus on 
criminal aliens.117  DHS created a three-level priority scheme, with the 
 
 116  See Doris Meissner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000) (setting out 
priorities for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in enforcement) [hereinafter 
Meissner Memo], available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference 
/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-
justice/government-documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-
Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00.pdf/view.  Since the functions of the INS were 
folded into DHS, Congress repeatedly directed the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the 
severity of that crime.”  See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3659 (2008).   
 117  E.g., John Morton, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the 
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011) 
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first category being the highest priority, and the second and third 
constituting equal but lesser priorities.  Priority 1 are aliens who pose 
a danger to national security or a risk to public safety.  Priority 2 are 
recent illegal entrants.  Lastly, priority 3 aliens are fugitives (i.e., have 
outstanding final removal orders) or otherwise obstruct immigration 
controls.118  Priorities 1 and 3 are further subdivided into higher and 
lower priority sub-categories.  For example, persons who committed 
more serious felonies are prioritized over those who committed 
minor crimes.119 
Beyond the broad priority categories, a large list of individual 
factors is to be considered in deciding whether to deport an 
immigrant.  These factors include, but are not limited to the 
following: the length of presence in the country; family ties to U.S. 
citizens; contribution to the community; military service; age; physical 
or mental disability; and status as a victim or witness to a crime.120  
“[N]o one factor is determinative,” and discretion is to be exercised 
on a case-by-case basis “based on the totality of the circumstances.”121  
The priority level and pertinent individual factors may be considered 
at any stage by DHS law enforcement agents or attorneys in their 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.122 Because prosecutorial 
discretion encompasses the allocation of investigative resources, these 
decisions too are to be guided by these priorities. 
A regime that is effectively shaped by these priorities might still 
seek to maximize the number of deportations, but would do so 
 
[hereinafter June 17, 2011 Memo] (“In light of the large number of administrative 
violations the agency is charged with addressing and the limited enforcement 
resources the agency has available, ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement 
personnel, detention space, and removal resources to ensure that the removals the 
agency does conduct promote the agency’s highest enforcement priorities, namely 
national security, public safety, and border security.”), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf. 
 118  John Morton, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Civil Immigration 
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 
2011) [hereinafter March 2, 2011 Memo], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 
 119  Id. at 3. 
 120  Id. at 3–4; June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5–6. 
 121  See June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 4.  A favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion with regard to some priority 1 individuals is statutorily 
foreclosed.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (The Attorney General “may cancel removal” 
only if, inter alia, the alien has not been convicted of “specified offenses”). 
 122  See, e.g., June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5 (“ICE may exercise 
prosecutorial discretion at any stage of an enforcement proceeding.”). 
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subject to the priority and resource constraints.123  This does not 
mean that enforcement resources would be allocated in accordance 
with any precise solution to a constrained optimization problem.  It 
does mean that effecting one high-priority deportation would be 
preferable to one low-priority deportation, all else being equal, but 
that no particular mix of priority levels must characterize the 
deported.124  Moreover, discretionary judgments aimed at screening 
for highest priority individuals would be clustered at the front-end of 
the process.  The earlier in the process high-priority individuals are 
identified, the fewer resources are expended on that determination 
later, and the greater the number of individuals deported at the 
end.125  Concentrating discretion at the front-end also reinforces 
important political126 and career pressures,127 while potentially 
 
 123  There is ample indication that the agency remains focused on delivering the 
highest possible number of deportations subject to the priority and resource 
constraints.  See, e.g., March 2, 2011 Memo, supra note 118, at 3 (“Nothing in this 
memorandum should be construed to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, 
detention, or removal of other aliens unlawfully in the United States. ICE special 
agents, officers, and attorneys may pursue the removal of any alien unlawfully in the 
United States.”); ICE, Fact-vs.-Fiction, http://www.ice.gov/news/fact-fiction/ (“Media 
have suggested that ICE is aggressively dismissing cases based on a directive from 
Director Morton.  This just isn’t true.”).  
 124  A regime shaped by federal priorities would be unlikely to concentrate all 
enforcement resources on deporting every last highest-priority alien.  For this reason, 
criticisms asserting that the federal government is not following its own priorities, 
simply because an insufficiently large share of deportations consists of the highest 
priority individuals, are misguided.  See, e.g., AMALIA GREENBERG DELGADO ET AL., 
ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF 
POLICING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 5, available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs
/criminal_justice/police_practices/costs_and_consequences.pdf (“[S]tatistics reveal 
a failure to follow these priorities” because “[b]etween 2008 and 2010, of all those 
deported nationwide under a new DHS program . . . only 28 percent were . . . Level 1 
Priority . . . and 25 percent were ‘non-criminals.’”).  At the same time, a priority-
driven regime would not lead to the deportation of every individual who has come to 
the attention of the authorities.  For that reason, criticisms such as Justice Scalia’s 
regarding the administrative costs of President Obama’s policy of deferring 
enforcement against young people are also misguided.  See Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The husbanding of scarce 
enforcement resources can hardly be the justification for [this policy], since the 
considerable administrative cost . . . will necessarily be deducted from immigration 
enforcement”). 
 125  See June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5 (“[I]t is generally preferable to 
exercise . . . discretion as early in the case or proceeding as possible in order to 
preserve government resources that would otherwise be expended in pursuing the 
enforcement proceeding.”). 
 126  The political pressures on deportation policy arise from the need to navigate 
between the accusation of a sub-rosa amnesty and the accusation of draconian 
patterns of enforcement against sympathetic individuals.  Accusations of a “back-door 
TREYGER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
2014] THE DEPORTATION CONUNDRUM 147 
 
sacrificing informational advantages.128 
B. De Facto Sub-federal Subversion 
Federal priorities are based on criminal history and the 
seriousness of the violation of immigration law.  A central motivation 
for this, according to ICE, is to build on the “broad consensus in the 
nation that persons convicted of serious crimes who are in the United 
States illegally should be subject to deportation.”129  It might indeed 
seem that prioritizing criminal aliens is a “slam dunk,” as Schuck has 
put it.130  It is “hard to imagine a higher law enforcement priority than 
this.”131  Nonetheless, many sub-federal actors manifestly disagree.  
Their dissatisfaction with federal priorities is of great consequence 
for the government, because the federal government relies on their 
cooperation to identify and apprehend most deportable non-citizens 
and because sub-federal actors have ample avenues to influence the 
contours of the deportation regime. 
The federal government relies on cooperation by state and local 
LEAs because the overwhelming majority of civilian-state contacts 
involve state or local forces.132  Cooperation is especially vital for 
 
amnesty” are much more likely to be aroused where the federal government has in 
fact identified deportable individuals whom they decide not to deport.  Likewise, 
accusations of draconian enforcement will only arise if some initial enforcement 
action is actually taken against particular individuals.   
 127  There is some evidence that DHS and DOJ disfavor affirmatively taking a 
deportable individual out of the deportation process.  See Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew 
Becker, ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, March 26, 
2010 (reporting that a memorandum from an ICE official applauded enforcement 
officers for efforts to reach a record goal of 150,000 criminal alien removals in 2010), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26
/AR2010032604891.html. 
 128  See Cox & Posner, supra note 19. 
 129  ICE OFFICE OF THE DIR., ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON SECURE 
COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ICE 
Response], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-response-to-
task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf. 
 130  Schuck, supra note 10, at 72. 
 131  Id. at 74. 
 132  Although ICE is now the second largest investigative agency in the federal 
government, it employs only 20,000 officers, by comparison with about 765,000 
sworn local law enforcers.  Brian Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2011). See 
generally Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2006) (arguing in favor of 
a vigorous immigration enforcement role relying, inter alia, on the superior 
resources and access of state and local law enforcement).  
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identifying and deporting criminal aliens.133  Sub-federal actors have 
ample avenues to influence deportation patterns because local law 
enforcement practices overwhelmingly determine who comes into 
initial contact with immigration enforcement.  In principle, “the 
universe of opportunities to exercise prosecutorial discretion is 
large.”134  In practice, however, the exercise of discretion has been 
heavily concentrated in the earlier stages of the process.  “The 
discretion that matters” for selecting the deportees, as Hiroshi 
Motomura put it, has been “the discretion to arrest.”135  This is 
especially true for the unauthorized population.136  The chances that 
any given deportable person would be targeted for investigation 
and/or arrested are not overwhelming.  The deportable population is 
large, and resource constraints allow the investigation and arrest of 
only a small fraction.  Once a deportable individual is arrested, 
however, the probability that he will be placed in deportation 
 
 133  See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 10, at 72 (“[E]ffective federal immigration 
enforcement often depends upon the extensive participation of state and local 
officials . . . particularly [in] enforcement against [criminal immigrants]”); Cox & 
Posner, supra note 87, at 1337–40 (describing the vital advantages of delegation to 
state and local officials).  To be sure, the necessity of sub-federal cooperation in 
immigration enforcement is not universally embraced.  The unsuccessful attempts of 
the federal government to coax states into advancing its priorities lead some scholars 
to conclude that sub-federal participation in enforcement would only make the 
immigration enforcement regime less effective as a whole.  See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 
9, at 35 (“[S]hifting immigration enforcement powers to sub-federal levels [will not 
compensate for the federal government’s failure to enforce its laws, but] will more 
likely lead to weaker federal enforcement and even less effective national security 
resources aimed at immigration enforcement and administration. . . .  [N]ot only is 
shifting immigration authority downward contrary to constitutional law and theory, it 
is bad policy and will lead to bad results both with immigration enforcement and 
local enforcement.”). 
 134  William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor for U.S. ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion 
2 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference
/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice
/government-documents/22092975-ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-
William-J-Howard-10-24-05.pdf/view. 
 135  Motomura, supra note 15, at 1837; see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 519 (2009) 
(“[C]harging decisions rather than either the formal legal rules or the exercise of 
judicial discretion determine who is deported and what collateral consequences 
attach to deportation.”).  
 136  As Stephen Lee explains, for legally present non-citizens who are arrested for a 
crime, the prosecutors’ charging decisions represent another node of discretionary 
decision-making that dictate whether or not these non-citizens become deportable 
and are ultimately deported.  De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553, 586-87 
(2013). 
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proceedings, and ultimately deported, is very high.137  While recent 
developments in federal policy promise to shift the exercise of 
discretion to later stages of the deportation process,138 the importance 
of the initial arrest or detention is little diminished. 
The following sections emphasize the levers available to sub-
federal authorities to thwart federal attempts to conform deportation 
patterns to their priorities.  Dissatisfied sub-federal actors are able to 
decisively alter the mix of priority levels that characterize the 
deported population through participation in federal-local 
partnerships, state criminal law, and ordinary arrest, detention, and 
charging practices. 
1.  287(g) Partnerships 
ICE operates several programs that enlist local agencies in 
partnerships to enforce immigration law.  Of these, 287(g) 
agreements involve local law enforcers most directly, and thus afford 
the clearest illustration of how local disagreement with federal 
priorities leads to their subversion.139 
The 287(g) agreements enable trained local law enforcers to 
perform certain immigration functions, such as screening individuals 
for immigration status, issuing detainers to hold potential violators 
and even issuing charging documents that trigger removability 
 
 137  While difficult to estimate with confidence, Motomura calculates that 
probability of deportation proceedings after arrest is between 75% and 100%, relying 
on some simplifying assumptions.  Motomura, supra note 15, at 1836.  The 
probability of Immigration Judges issuing a removal order was about 70% nationwide 
in 2011.  See TRAC, Tracking Outcomes of ICE Deportation Filings (Oct. 21, 2011), 
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/263/.  After a removal order is 
issued, discretion in the form of deferred action has been numerically insignificant: 
in 2010, deferred action was granted to 514 persons, or .1% of those ordered 
deported. See Dara Lind, LA Opinion: Obama Has Granted a Record Low Number of 
Deferred Actions to Immigrants (Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/la_opinion_obama_has_granted_a_record_lo
w_number_of_deferred_actions/. 
 138  Notably, the activation of Secure Communities, see infra note 163 and 
accompanying text.  
 139  Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the 
Attorney General to deputize and train local law enforcement agencies to perform 
certain functions of federal immigration officers, at local expense.  8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) (2013).  Other programs, such as the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and 
the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), are predominantly carried out 
by federal officers, but do rely on local actors mostly to facilitate ICE access to 
foreign-born inmates.  DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE 
MACHINERY 105 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org
/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.   
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proceedings.140  The stated purpose of these partnerships is to identify 
and apprehend serious criminals and fugitive aliens.141  In practice, 
LEAs empowered to act by these agreements pursued a wider set of 
targets.  LEAs that acquired the authority to arrest immigration 
violators, for example, employed it to indiscriminately sweep in many 
non-criminals.  Maricopa County’s Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), under 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and Alamance County’s Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”), 
under Sheriff Terry S. Johnson, furnish the most notorious examples.  
The MCSO employed its new authority to engage in policing driven 
by “bias-infected indicators,” and MCSO deputies were found to 
“stop, detain, and/or arrest Latino drivers . . . without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.”142  Among other findings, the ACSO 
Sheriff was found to have explicitly directed officers “to arrest all 
Latinos who commit[ed] the traffic infraction of driving without a 
license” in order to “bring them into the Alamance County Jail to be 
run through immigration databases, rather than simply issuing them 
citations.”143  The Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated these 
LEAs and determined that both the MCSO and the ACSO violated 
the Constitution.144  Maricopa and Alamance may be extreme 
 
 140  Under the “jail model,” these agreements deputize local officers to screen the 
immigration status of arrested individuals; under the “task force” model, officers are 
authorized to enforce immigration law “on the street,” including the issuance of 
arrest warrants and detainers.  For a detailed explanation, see Capps et al., supra note 
110, at 13–16. 
 141  Although the federal priority system was not spelled out until 2010, earlier 
declarations that criminal and fugitive aliens are to be prioritized were commonplace 
in Congress and the DHS.  See RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, A 
PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(G) 
(2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf.  
 142  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT RE: UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE 
MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 3 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ MCSO 
Report] (finding evidence of racial profiling of Latino drivers, and of “immigration-
related crime suppression activities” based on “complaints that described no criminal 
activity, but rather referred . . . to individuals with ‘dark skin’ congregating in one 
area, or individuals speaking Spanish”), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt
/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf. 
 143  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT RE: UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE 
ALAMANCE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 5 (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ ACSO 
Report], available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources
/171201291812462488198.pdf. 
 144  Id. at 2; DOJ MCSO Report, supra note 142, at 3.  Reacting to MCSO’s 
indiscriminant use of authority, ICE initially declined to renew the agreement 
granting the MCSO arrest authority in 2009, and ultimately, terminated the MCSO’s 
involvement in immigration enforcement.  See Office of the Press Secretary, Statement 
by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County 
(Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-
napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county. 
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examples.  Yet, as numerous evaluations confirm, the apparent 
disregard for federal priorities has been widespread, and much of the 
local contribution to the deportation pipeline has consisted of people 
charged with or convicted of misdemeanors and traffic offenses.145  
This experience led DHS to revise the terms of the agreements to 
provide for more extensive federal oversight, and ultimately, to 
announce that it is scaling down the 287(g) program.146 
While scaling down 287(g) programs constrains the most far-
reaching authority granted to local actors, it does not foreclose the 
opportunities for sub-federal authorities to influence immigration 
enforcement.  Even in the absence of delegated functions, 
substantive criminal laws and ordinary criminal law enforcement are 
sufficient to undermine federal attempts to affect its priorities. 
2. Substantive Criminal Law 
State criminal law not only determines which non-citizens 
become deportable, but also influences where individuals fit into the 
federal priority scheme.  For example, whether an individual has 
been convicted of two or more felonies “punishable by more than 
one year,” which would place him into level 1 of priority category 1, 
 
 145  See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE 
PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS: FY 2011 UPDATE 9 ( “ICE cannot be assured 
that the 287(g) program is meeting its intended purpose, or that resources are being 
appropriately targeted toward aliens who pose the greatest risk to public safety and 
the community”), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-
119_Sep11.pdf; RICHARD M. STANA, GAO, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER 
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009) (finding no evidence that 287(g) agreements 
advanced the federal enforcement priorities), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf; DORA SCHRIRO, ICE, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009) (finding that in 2008, 57%  of 
the noncitizens in detention as the result of the 287(g) program were noncriminal, 
and 72% of the initial bookings were noncriminal, with those figures being 53% and 
65% in 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-
detention-rpt.pdf; Capps et al., supra note 110, at 2 (finding that the 287(g) program 
is not targeted toward serious offenders, as about half of the program activity involves 
people who have committed misdemeanors or traffic offenses).   
 146  See John Morton, Statement Regarding a Hearing on U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request to Congress (Mar. 8, 2012) (“ICE will begin 
by discontinuing the least productive 287(g) task force agreements in those 
jurisdictions where Secure Communities is already in place and will also suspend 
consideration of any requests for new 287(g) agreements.”), available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=38896&linkid=244574; see also 
Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, ICE, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 
2013). 
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
152 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
hinges in part on the application of state criminal laws.  So does the 
existence of convictions for “crimes punishable by less than one 
year,” which place a person into priority 1, level 2 (if for three such 
crimes) and level 3 (if fewer than three).  As a number of scholars 
have noted, states can and do use their criminal laws to “facilitate the 
criminal prosecution of unauthorized migrants at the state and local 
level.”147  The same laws may trigger civil deportation proceedings and 
elevate, or lower, an individual’s priority level. 
Several states, for example, have enacted criminal laws that 
mirror the federal provision criminalizing smuggling or harboring 
undocumented aliens.148  Maricopa County has adopted an ingenious 
interpretation of Arizona’s smuggling law in order to prosecute 
immigrants who use the services of coyotes (smugglers) with 
conspiracy to violate that law, a felony.149  Interpreting the law in that 
manner effectively “criminalizes unlawful presence,”150 and raises the 
priority levels of a large class of aliens, who might not be guilty of any 
felony under federal law.151 While this particular interpretation of the 
smuggling statute was recently enjoined by a federal judge on federal 
preemption grounds,152 as was the South Carolina statute explicitly 
criminalizing self-smuggling,153 there is no shortage of laws that may 
 
 147  Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 138 (2009).  
 148  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2319; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 446 (West) 
(2012); Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-114 (2012). See generally, Stumpf, supra note 9, at 
1599 (discussing states that have “enacted laws similar to the federal prohibitions on 
smuggling or harboring undocumented immigrants”).  
 149  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1003(A); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2319.  For a 
fascinating account of these prosecutions, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration 
Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011).   
 150  Eagly, supra note 149, at 1773; United States v. S. Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529 
(4th Cir. 2013) (addressing a South Carolina statutory provision that similarly made 
it a felony “for an unlawfully present person to allow himself or herself to be 
‘transported or moved’ within the state or to be harbored or sheltered to avoid 
detection,” and finding that it would be nearly impossible for such a person to avoid 
violating this provisions).  
 151  That is, a person convicted of the conspiracy felony under Maricopa’s 
interpretation might otherwise be guilty of illegal entry, a misdemeanor, which 
would put him into priority 2 under the federal scheme; a felony conviction for the 
same conduct instantly raises his priority level to 1.  
 152  We Are Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs, CIV 06-2816-PHX-RCB, 2013 WL 
5434158 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2013) (holding that federal law preempts and renders 
invalid the Maricopa policy of prosecuting unauthorized immigrants for smuggling 
themselves). 
 153  United States v. S. Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 530 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming the 
district court’s holding that plaintiffs established a substantial likelihood of success 
on the merits in their challenge to a provision, which made it a criminal offense for 
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be applied to similar effect.  Laws that criminalize the use of false 
documents may have similar effects when applied to individuals who 
would not have been subject to federal prosecution.  For example, 
Arizona’s general identity theft law criminalizes as a felony the 
“taking the identity of another person . . . real or fictitious . . . 
whether or not the person . . . actually suffers any economic loss.”154  
This law, as Chacon observed, “can be deployed as a means of 
prosecuting noncitizens who have used false identities to obtain 
employment,” even if that noncitizen would not be prosecuted or 
found guilty under federal laws governing the use of such false 
documents.155  The sole surviving provision of California’s Proposition 
187 makes the use of false documents a felony when done “to 
conceal . . . true citizenship or resident alien status.”156  As Stumpf 
observes, the state law relies on contentious concepts of “true 
citizenship or resident alien status;” thus, state interpretations of 
these may depart from federal understandings, leading to convictions 
of persons who would otherwise not be criminally liable.157  Such laws 
offer disgruntled local actors a way to ensure that non-citizens, who 
do not engage in any conventionally criminal conduct, become 
prioritized for deportation.158  The constitutionality of some state 
criminal laws that parallel immigration law, such as the 
criminalization of self-smuggling, has been put in doubt by Arizona v. 
United States.159 Nonetheless, other laws that link criminal liability to 
 
“a person unlawfully present in the United States to conceal, harbor, or shelter 
herself from detection, or allow herself to be transported within the state,” on federal 
preemption grounds).  
 154  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2008 (2008).  
 155  Chacon, supra note 147, at 138. 
 156  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 
1995) (holding that provisions of Proposition 187 criminalizing making and using 
false documents to conceal true citizenship or resident alien status of person were 
not preempted by federal law). 
 157  See Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1599.  Persons who are convicted under the 
California law might otherwise be subject to only civil penalties under the analogous 
federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2013), which enacts civil and criminal penalties for a 
variety of violations regarding false immigration documents. 
 158  For an account of a marked change in the patterns of enforcement of the 
false-documents crime in Los Angeles as the county’s orientation towards 
immigration enforcement evolved, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: 
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 NYU L. REV. 1126, 1167–79 (2013).  
 159  132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–05 (2012) (finding both challenged provisions that 
created new immigration-based state crimes preempted: the crime of non-
compliance with federal registration law, on the ground that the state provision 
intruded into the field in which Congress has left no room for states to act; and the 
crime of working without authorization, on the ground that a state’s criminalization 
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immigration status—notably, laws of general applicability and those 
that parallel generally applicable criminal law—appear to be on 
firmer footing.160 
Local actors are further able to manipulate a deportable non-
citizen’s priority level through plea bargaining and sentencing.  
Prosecutors and courts have in the past structured plea bargains to 
avoid (or create) deportation consequences for some defendants.161  
Similarly, these actors may adopt plea bargaining practices to lower 
particular defendants’ priority levels—by, for example, allowing them 
to plead guilty for crimes punishable by less than one year, rather 
 
of that which Congress decided should be regulated civilly, presents an obstacle to 
the regulatory system).   
 160  Several courts held that laws of general applicability applied to non-citizens, 
and laws that parallel generally-applicable prohibitions, are constitutionally sound.  
See, e.g., Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583 (2013) (holding that a 
statute requiring a driver’s license to be obtained  within 30 days before driving 
within state was not preempted by federal immigration law); Hernandez v. State, 639 
S.E.2d 473 (2007) (rejecting the alien defendant’s claim that federal immigration law 
preempts the enforcement of a general identity fraud statute); State v. Hernandez-
Mercado, 879 P.2d 283 (Wash. 1994) (holding that a statute criminalizing unlicensed 
possession of a firearm by an alien is not preempted).  See generally Jennifer M. 
Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 628 (2012) 
(“State efforts that criminalize activities in order to affect migration indirectly,” 
rather than directly by mirroring federal immigration prohibitions, “have, in many 
cases, avoided court scrutiny”); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The 
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 
251, 274 (2011) (“[S]tates likely have the power to enact criminal laws that affect 
only undocumented noncitizens, so long as those laws are rational, are within 
traditional state power, seek a permissible goal, and are consistent with federal 
classifications.  [E.g.,] state laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by 
undocumented noncitizens are likely constitutional.”); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1608 
(“When there is a strong parallel with federal immigration law and no parallel 
criminal law applicable regardless of citizenship, the subnational criminal law is 
unlikely to survive[,]” but laws that parallel generally-applicable criminal law “stand[] 
a greater chance of surviving, even when the law singles out noncitizens and parallels 
existing immigration law.”).  For an account of how enforcement of such laws reflects 
local attitudes towards immigration enforcement, see Eagly, supra note 158, at 1167–
68, 1185–87.   
 161  See Lee, supra note 136, at 578–80 (describing instances of prosecutorial 
charging decisions adopted to avoid deportation of criminal defendants); Gabriel J. 
Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the 
Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1433–35 (2011) (describing charging and 
bargaining practices structured to avoid deportation consequences); Stumpf, supra 
note 9, at 1593–94 (explaining that “legislatures and courts can often affect 
whether . . . deportability grounds apply by adjusting the scope of the definition or 
length of the sentence”); Spiro, supra note 11, at 1634 n.28 (noting the ability of sub-
national actors  “to undermine enforcement . . . by adjusting criminal sentences to 
preclude deportation in individual cases”). 
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than more than one year.162 
3. Secure Communities and Ordinary Criminal Law 
Enforcement 
LEAs most significantly exercise their influence on the selection 
of non-citizens for deportation in the course of ordinary criminal law 
enforcement.  LEA policies and practices concerning arrests and 
investigations of immigration statuses matter a great deal in 
determining who comes into contact with the deportation system.  
This influence, moreover, is not neutralized by the gradual 
nationwide activation of Secure Communities, a data interoperability 
system that automatically transmits information on each arrest to 
ICE.163 
Prior to its activation, whether an individual came into contact 
with the immigration enforcement system was to a great degree 
determined by local discretion.  DHS is required by law to “respond 
to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking 
to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status.”164  Thus, 
whenever a local official contacts ICE with such inquiries, the 
enforcement machinery is put in motion, with the corresponding 
increase in probability of deportation for that individual.165  
Jurisdictions seeking more aggressive enforcement needed only to 
adopt a policy or practice of regular verification of the immigration 
status of those arrested or detained, or other individuals encountered 
in the course of ordinary law enforcement.166  In one survey of police 
 
 162  See Lee, supra note 136, at 577–80 (offering examples of prosecutors 
structuring charges to “unsettle, dilute, or outright displace federal priorities”); 
Eagly, supra note 158, at 1164–65 (“[T]he Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office has 
officially given deputy prosecutors the discretion to take collateral consequences,” 
including deportation, “into account and depart from ordinary settlement policy in 
lower-level cases.”). 
 163  Under Secure Communities, fingerprints taken by LEAs are automatically 
transmitted to the FBI and then to DHS; if the person has been previously 
fingerprinted by an immigration official, the database will register a “match.”  ICE 
then reviews other databases to determine whether the person is deportable.  See The 
Secure Communities Process, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 164  8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1996).  DHS operates the Law Enforcement Support 
Center (LESC), which is responsible for answering status inquiries from various 
agencies.  If LESC determines that a given individual is in violation of the 
immigration laws, ICE will have to expend resources determining whether or not to 
seek deportation.  See David Palmatier, Decl. of Unit Chief for LESC, Arizona, 2012 
WL 406205, at *91 (2012) [hereinafter Palmatier Declaration].   
 165  See notes supra 135–137, and accompanying text. 
 166  E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-1051(B) (West 2012) (requiring state officers to 
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chiefs and sheriffs, 59% of respondents indicated that it was their 
practice or policy to routinely check the immigration status of a 
possible victim of human trafficking, and 21% of police chiefs and 
27% of county sheriffs would do so for individuals stopped as a traffic 
violation.167 
The section of Arizona’s SB 1070 that contained such a policy 
was the only one to survive the constitutional challenge.  The 
mandate to determine immigration status—that is, to contact LESC—
may therefore be triggered by seizures short of formal arrests (e.g., 
routine traffic stops).  In this way, LEAs are able to compel ICE 
attention to potential immigration law violators who have not 
committed crimes, thereby diverting resources from federal 
priorities.168  To be sure, ICE is still able to exercise discretion and 
take no action in these cases, as it threatened to do with regard to 
Arizona’s inquiries after the Supreme Court’s decision.169  However, 
the volume diminishes the resources that ICE may devote to screen 
for and pursue higher priority violators, and compels ICE to choose 
between pursuing non-priority deportations and incurring the 
political cost of forbearance after a violator has been identified.170 
On the other hand, localities that want no part in enforcing 
immigration laws adopted different policing and law enforcement 
 
make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person 
they stop or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that 
the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States,” and “[a]ny 
person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before 
the person is released”); see also Rodríguez, supra note 10, at 591–92 (summarizing 
direct enforcement actions in Georgia, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arizona); 
Huntington, supra note 13, at 801–02 (discussing the inherent enforcement authority 
of states and localities); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1598 (discussing local attempts to 
exercise non-delegated immigration powers).   
 167  Monica W. Varsanyi et al., A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration 
Federalism in the United States, 34 L. & POL’Y 146 (2011), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00356.x/abstract. 
 168 See Palmatier Declaration, supra note 164, at *91 (explaining in detail how the 
increased volume of queries from Arizona would impact priorities).  The burden 
placed on LESC was one of the factors the United States emphasized in its attack on 
Arizona’s SB 1070, arguing that Arizona’s aggressive enforcement policy would be 
“hijacking” federal resources, “shift[ing] the allocation of federal resources away 
from federal priorities.”  United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (D. Ariz. 
2010).   
 169  Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, AZ CAP. 
TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25 
/homeland-security-revokes-287g-immigration-check-agreements-in-
arizona/#ixzz2jX7qglQC. 
 170  See supra notes 126–127. 
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policies. “Sanctuary” or non-cooperation policies, implemented by 
statutes, executive orders, or police policies, aim to limit local or state 
officials’ cooperation with DHS in apprehending and processing of 
immigration violators.171  Congress sought in 1996 to curtail sub-
federal non-cooperation by forbidding officials from restricting a 
voluntary exchange of information regarding immigration status 
between local officials and ICE.172  Congressional action limited the 
forms that non-cooperation can take, but it could not counteract all 
such efforts.173  The LAPD’s non-cooperation policy, for example, 
which directed officers not to “initiate police action where the 
objective is to discover the alien status of a person,” but did not 
prohibit voluntary communications between LA police and ICE, was 
found to be consistent with federal statute.174  Similar policies guide 
law enforcement in numerous jurisdictions.175  Prior to the activation 
of Secure Communities, these sorts of policies and practices withheld 
from ICE information about high- and low-priority immigration 
violators alike, diminishing the overall numbers of deportations in 
sanctuary-type jurisdictions. 
The activation of Secure Communities was intended in part to 
constrain the impact of local practices on the size and composition of 
the population placed in deportation proceedings.  That effect, 
however, relies on the expectation “that LEAs continue to enforce 
 
 171  See Rodriguez supra note 10, at 600–605; Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Rights 
not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1373, 1382–95 (2006). 
 172  8 U.S.C. §1373, §1644 (1996); City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 
(2d. Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the federal restrictions on non-
cooperation). 
 173  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 174  Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1421 (2009) (upholding the 
LAPD policy against a facial constitutional challenge, and reasoning that Special 
Order 40 “does not address communication with ICE; it addresses only the initiation 
of police action and arrests for illegal entry.  [8 U.S.C.] Section 1373(a) does not 
address the initiation of police action or arrests for illegal entry; it addresses only 
communications with ICE”).   
 175  See, e.g., New Haven, Conn., New Haven Police Department General Order 06-
2 (Dec. 14, 2006) (prohibiting officers from inquiring about the immigration status 
of victims, witnesses, and anyone who approaches an officer for assistance, and 
prohibiting detention based on belief of illegal presence or civil immigration 
violation, including administrative warrants by ICE), available at 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID=%7B874974A9-AC89-
465B-A649-57D122E9FAF9%7D; OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1) (2007) (providing that 
no Oregon law enforcement agency “shall use agency [resources] for the purpose of 
detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are 
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal 
immigration laws”). 
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the criminal law in exactly the same manner as they did before 
Secure Communities was activated,” and that LEAs fully cooperate 
with ICE detainer requests.176 
Neither expectation appears well-founded.  Instead of 
diminishing their role, Secure Communities merely altered the 
manner in which sub-federal authorities could influence the 
deportation process.177  LEAs intent on more aggressive enforcement 
have several avenues still open to them.  They are able, in particular, 
to aggressively arrest for petty crimes (e.g., traffic violations) 
committed by foreign-appearing individuals.178  The automatic 
process set off by Secure Communities makes it unnecessary for LEAs 
to incur any costs in effort or resources beyond arresting and finger-
printing suspected unauthorized aliens.  States may even broaden the 
arrest authority of their police to the constitutional limits, allowing 
arrests upon probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed 
any misdemeanor, including the misdemeanor of illegal entry.179  
States may also expand the use of fingerprinting to all minor 
offenses.  Moreover, Secure Communities does not affect Arizona-
style mandates to verify immigration statuses of individuals detained 
in contexts short of formal arrests. 
The power to arrest is complemented by the discretionary power 
to charge.  The initial determination of an immigration violator’s 
priority level is based in part on the offense of arrest, or offense 
charged, and not just convictions existing as of the time of arrest.180  
 
 176  See ICE Response, supra note 129, at 11. 
 177  See Jennifer M. Chacon, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 603 (2012) (implying that the theorized shift of discretion 
back to the federal government from sub-federal actors may not be borne out in 
practice). 
 178  Eagly documents examples of such arrest policies: in Harris County, Texas, for 
instance, police refuse to “cite and release” for petty offenses, choosing to take 
custody and book all such suspects. See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1173–74.  Likewise, a 
public defender in Miami-Dade County, Florida, reports the increase in arrests “for 
charges we would not normally see,” and of which “many are dismissed outright,” 
after the activation of Secure Communities.  Alex Stepick, FALSE PROMISES: THE 
FAILURE OF SECURE COMMUNITIES IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON 
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC POLICY, CENTER FOR LABOR RESEARCH & STUDIES, FLORIDA 
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 9 (2013). 
 179  See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1413 (“In theory, local police 
could arrest for misdemeanor improper entry into the United States.”). 
 180  As the GAO explains in its review of the program, “aliens are initially classified 
as Level 1, 2, or 3” based on “available information on the aliens’ arrest charges and 
any previous convictions.”  GAO, SECURE COMMUNITIES, REPORT TO THE RANKING 
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 22 (July 
2012) (emphasis added) [hereinafter GAO 2012 Report], available at 
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LEAs intent on more aggressive enforcement may seek the most 
serious plausible charges, as this increases the likelihood that ICE will 
issue a detainer and seek custody of the individual.181  Under Secure 
Communities, the decision to pursue more serious charges imposes 
few costs, because local officials can decide not to prosecute and 
instead, transfer the suspected violators to ICE custody promptly 
upon receiving a detainer request.182 
The question of whether and how Secure Communities 
influenced local arresting and charging practices awaits systematic 
empirical investigation; yet, there is some indication that local actors 
are continuing to use the tools at their disposal to affect the 
deportation system.  Available data suggests that most arrests are 
made for traffic offenses, where the discretion to arrest (or cite and 
release) is at its peak.183  Preliminary studies also suggest the 
likelihood that Secure Communities lead some LEAs to engage in 
pretextual arrests of Hispanic individuals.184  DHS officials are 
 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592415.pdf.  Thus, aliens ultimately removed may 
not have “a criminal conviction known to ICE at the time ICE took custody,” and 
ultimately, “may not . . . [be] convicted of the current criminal charge(s) for which 
they were arrested.”  Id. at 15 n.29.  Because “ICE could change the classification if 
the alien’s charges are dropped,” removal statistics reveal that many of the deported 
are not convicted of any crime.  Id. at 22 n.30.  Nationwide, that share was 26% 
(October 2008 to March 2012), but there is variability across jurisdictions: for 
example, 41% of those identified and deported from Florida had no criminal 
convictions, while that share in Texas stood at 17%.  Id. at 19.  Although many factors 
likely contribute to these spatial differences, it is consistent with the possibility that 
LEAs in different jurisdictions are pursuing different arrest and charging strategies.  
 181 See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1188(“[P]rosecutors have gone further by actually 
choosing among potential charges with the objective of influencing immigration 
results.”). While DHS generally cannot deport individuals who are convicted before 
they complete their sentence, see INA § 241(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(4)(A) 
(2006), there is no barrier to removal if the state criminal charges that led to the 
identification of a deportable individual via Secure Communities are not pursued. 
 182  Eagly documents a related phenomenon in Maricopa County’s enforcement 
of the smuggling law: the county “either transfers suspected self-smugglers directly to 
ICE or gives very low criminal sentences (of “time served” or probation), which 
facilitate immediate removal,” while reducing law enforcement costs. Eagly, supra 
note 158, at 1186. 
 183  ICE did not collect data on arrest charges until October 2010, and since then, 
this data was missing for 56% of aliens identified and removed through Secure 
Communities.  “For the 44 percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest 
charge data, traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were 
the most frequent arrest charges.”  GAO 2012 Report, supra note 180, at second 
cover page, 14. 
 184  See Aarti Kohli et al., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW 
AND SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH REPORT 3 (Oct. 2011) (finding some evidence that 
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concerned about the incentives created by Secure Communities.  To 
curtail the possibility of local subversion of this sort, a monitoring 
system was put in place that is aimed at detecting jurisdictions that 
are making improper arrests.185  How well such a monitoring system 
would detect and deter subversion of federal priorities remains to be 
seen.  In view of the difficulties of making inferences on the basis of 
available data, which ICE recognizes,186 the likely effects of 
monitoring on sub-federal subversion are ambiguous.  ICE leadership 
also directed its officials not to issue detainers on the basis of “minor 
traffic misdemeanors or other relatively minor misdemeanors,” unless 
the violations “reflect a clear and continuing danger to others or 
disregard for the law.”187  Such an approach might serve to screen out 
some low-level traffic violators—but not before limited resources are 
expended on the determination.  Moreover, local officers determine 
the crime of arrest, with little standing in their way of identifying a 
non-traffic offense as the crime of arrest.188  It is unclear, moreover, 
whether ICE at present possesses the capacity to base its initial 
detainer decisions on the nature of the crime of arrest.189  In sum, 
aggressive jurisdictions still have a number of levers available to flood 
ICE with a large, low-priority pool of candidates. 
 
Secure Communities lead law enforcement agencies “to engage in racial profiling 
through the targeting of Latinos for minor violations or pretextual arrests”), available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf; 
see also supra note 178. 
 185  See DHS, SECURE COMMUNITIES: STATISTICAL MONITORING  (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-statistical-monitoring.pdf 
[hereinafter Statistical Monitoring]. 
 186  Id. at 1 (noting that “some [statistical] anomalies [in arrest patterns] are likely 
to be pure artifacts of the limited data available,” and outlining several important 
limitations of the data available for monitoring). 
 187  JOHN MORTON, ICE, CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: GUIDANCE ON THE USE 
OF DETAINERS IN THE FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2 
n.2 (Dec. 21, 2012), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf.   
 188  See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 158, at 1183 (quoting a Maricopa County public 
defense attorney, who explains that “an inoffensive traffic stop for some violation of 
the traffic code invariably turns into a felony forgery charge when the driver provides 
what the police officer believes is a fraudulent driver’s license or identification either 
from Arizona or Mexico”). 
 189 See Statistical Monitoring, supra note 185, at 7 (“ICE does not currently receive 
analyzable data on the nature of the arrest for which a fingerprint submission is 
being made”; ICE does “not know in real time whether a submission is based on a 
traffic offense or a violent crime,” and “rel[ies]on follow-up ICE investigations to 
make that data available”).  
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4. Sanctuary and Non-Cooperation Policies 
Nor does Secure Communities eviscerate the power of sanctuary 
jurisdictions to serve as gate-keepers to the deportation system.  First, 
states can choose to keep minor offenders hidden from federal 
attention by not booking them190 or by not taking fingerprints.191  
Second, criminal charges may be reduced or dropped, so as to lower 
the initial priority level of arrested non-citizens.  Third, LEAs are able 
to exercise their own discretion when it comes to complying with ICE 
requests to hold suspected violators.192  The most recent and most 
visible such measure is California’s TRUST Act, which prohibits state 
and local law enforcement from holding certain low-level arrestees on 
the basis of ICE detainers.193  A number of other jurisdictions have 
been adopting similar measures: Cook County, for instance, 
announced that the Sheriff’s Office will honor ICE detainers only if 
ICE has a criminal warrant, ICE enters into a written agreement to 
reimburse Cook County for the cost of holding the detainees, or if 
Cook County has a law enforcement purpose not related to 
immigration to hold the person.194  Santa Clara, CA, and Washington 
D.C. both limited compliance with ICE detainers to individuals over 
18 years of age, and only to those convicted of a “serious or violent 
felony” (“dangerous crime or crime of violence” in DC) within 10 
years of the request, or released after having served a sentence for 
such a felony within 5 years of the request.195 
 
 190  In many jurisdictions, the decision whether to make a custodial arrest or cite 
and release is left to the discretion of the officers, and a law enforcement agency may 
direct its officers not to book minor offenders, in part to avoid the Secure 
Communities screening.  See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1158–59 (describing the Los 
Angeles policy of citing and releasing for low-level crimes).   
 191  See ICE Response, supra note 129129, at 14 (noting that “states can choose not 
to submit to the federal government the fingerprints for individuals arrested for 
minor offenses”). 
 192  See, e.g., Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (S.D. Ind. 
2011) quoting (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request 
that the law enforcement agency ‘advise [DHS], prior to release of the alien, in order 
for [DHS] to arrange to assume custody.’”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011)). 
 193  Patrick McGreevy, Signing Trust Act is Another Illegal-immigration Milestone for 
Brown, L. A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-brown-
immigration-20131006,0,5441798.story#axzz2jv4eEQdy. 
 194 See Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers, COOK COUNTY LEGISLATIVE 
REFERENCE SERVICES (Sept. 7, 2011), http://cookcountygov.com
/ll_lib_pub_cook/cook_ordinance.aspx?WindowArgs=1501. 
 195  Santa Clara County Resolution Adding Board Policy 3.54 Relating to Civil 
Immigration Detainer Requests,  http://www.immigrantjustice.org
/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Santa%20Clara%20County%20Detainer
%20Ordinance.pdf; COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE ON THE 
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
162 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
 If aggressive enforcers undermine federal deportation policy by 
“diluting” the pool of deportation candidates and diverting resources 
from higher- to lower-priority candidates, jurisdictions with sanctuary 
measures undermine it by keeping potentially higher priority 
candidates away from ICE and diverting apprehension resources 
from other areas towards the task of re-apprehending individuals 
already in county custody.  As a result of Cook County’s non-
cooperation, for example, 268 detainers for individuals charged or 
convicted of a crime were disregarded, and ICE was able to locate 
only 15 after release.196 
Federal immigration enforcers are besieged on both sides.  The 
ability of state and local police to use criminal law, arrest powers, and 
the discretion inherent in routine law enforcement “to decide who 
will be,” and who will not be, “exposed to federal immigration 
enforcement,” makes them the de facto “gatekeepers” of the 
deportation pipeline.197 
C. The Trouble with the Status Quo 
If, as was argued in Part I, centrally crafted and nation-wide 
priorities are poor proxies for sorting migrants on the basis of social 
desirability, why should sub-federal subversion of federal priorities be 
of any concern?  There are a few reasons to regret the state of affairs.  
First, de jure federal exclusivity over priority setting fortifies 
incentives for states and localities to engage in problematic 
“criminalization” of immigration law.198  More central to present 
 
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585, IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT 
ACT OF 2012 (May 8, 2012), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001
/20120604161227.pdf; Mihir Zaveri, D.C. Council Votes to Limit Reach of Federal Effort 
Aimed at Illegal Immigration, WASH. POST (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-council-votes-to-limit-reach-of-federal 
-effort-aimed-at-illegal-immigration/2012/06/05/gJQAVgm5GV_story.html.  See also 
Brent Begin, San Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold Inmates for ICE, S. F. EXAMINER (May 
6, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/05 
/san-francisco-county-jail-won-t-hold-inmates-ice; National Immigration Forum, 
Community and Courtroom Responses to Immigration Detainers (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images
/uploads/2012/Detainers_Bonds_Litigation.pdf (describing policies in New York 
City, Sonoma, Santa Clara, and San Francisco Counties in California, and Taos and 
San Miguel Counties in New Mexico). 
 196  See Toni Preckwinkle, Letter to John Morton 2 (Jan. 19, 2012) (discussing 
Morton’s earlier letter to Preckwinkle) (on file with author). 
 197  Motomura, supra note 15, at 1822. 
 198  Insofar as the increasing entanglement of criminal and immigration law is 
worrisome, as many immigration scholars argue, the incentives created by federal 
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concerns, under the status quo, the deportation regime does not do a 
good job of prioritizing the least socially desirable violators of 
immigration laws.  Critics of sub-federal involvement in immigration 
enforcement point out that instead of advancing federal priorities, 
local officials are pursuing their own local preferences.199  Scholars 
who are less critical note that this is not necessarily pernicious, as it 
allows for local conditions and information to bear on the screening 
function that deportation is intended to serve.200 
If the status quo actually allowed states and localities to assert 
local societal preferences over the federally imposed ones, there 
might not be a need to formally decentralize priority setting.  
However, the sense in which states and localities may be said to 
pursue “their own priorities” is markedly different from the sense in 
which DHS attempts to pursue federal priorities.  The actual effect of 
rebellious jurisdictions’ activity is on the level of enforcement.  Cook 
County may decrease the level of immigration enforcement on its 
territory by keeping some people out of the deportation pipeline.  
Cook County cannot ensure, however, that the particular immigrants 
or types are not in fact deported as a result of ICE’s independent 
effort.  Nor does it fully internalize the consequences of forbearance 
with regard to all categories of migrants it declines to hand over to 
ICE.  Since ICE does in fact pursue enforcement on its territory, it 
may well remove individuals whose presence would have aroused the 
community’s opposition.  Moreover, because local officials distance 
themselves from deportation policy decisions, communities are 
unlikely to perceive local officials as important and responsive policy-
 
prioritization of criminal aliens are problematic.  See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note at 9, 
1613–15; Legomsky, supra note 70.  The obvious path for sub-federal actors who 
disagree with federal deportation practices is to use its criminal laws and law 
enforcement to turn as many unauthorized migrants into criminals (or accused) as 
possible, raising their priority levels.  As others have pointed out, the fact that states 
and localities are able to criminally prosecute deportable non-citizens for state 
crimes, but are unable to formally initiate civil deportation proceedings creates the 
same incentives.  See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 149, at 1755.  For a comprehensive 
account of how federal criminalization of immigration law drew subnational actors 
into the business of immigration regulation and enforcement, see Stumpf, supra note 
9, at 1587–1600. 
 199  See, e.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 141, at 13 (“This devolution [of authority 
via 287(g) agreements] arguably has permitted local officials, including elected 
sheriffs, to set enforcement priorities to meet local concerns rather than to 
contribute to a broader national enforcement agenda.”). 
 200  See Cox & Posner, supra note 87, at 1337–42 (explaining the advantages and 
disadvantages of delegating immigration enforcement authority to states and 
localities). 
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makers in this arena.  Restrictionist jurisdictions, such as Maricopa, 
may force some into the pipeline whose deportation ICE would not 
have otherwise pursued.  Just like Cook County, however, Maricopa 
has no meaningful way to ensure that particular types of violators 
among those they identify are prioritized.  Any disagreements about 
the “which ones” question are reduced to a tug of war regarding the 
“how many” question. 
Sub-federal actors opposed to federal policy are rarely put in a 
position to assess and articulate their own priorities in a manner that 
exposes them to the democratic pressures of their constituents.  
Instead, arrest patterns might follow the priorities asserted by a 
sheriff or a chief of police.  In most jurisdictions, even such agency-
level guidance is absent, and the officer on the street exercises the 
authority to determine who comes into contact with the immigration 
enforcement apparatus.201  LEAs and their officers are certainly not 
unaccountable.  But in an arena characterized by overlapping 
jurisdictional authority, it is difficult to ascertain what level of 
government and what actors are responsible for policing choices that 
drive deportation patterns.202 
 As a result, the toughest questions about deportation do not get 
asked or answered explicitly by those levels of government that are in 
the best position “to assess and manage the tradeoffs among 
conflicting public goals peculiar to their polities.”203  Inducing sub-
federal authorities to grapple explicitly with the tradeoffs that attend 
deportation choices would subject these choices to some level of 
public scrutiny and input.  Opening the debate in this way, and 
explicitly identifying particular sub-federal government branches as 
those responsible for setting priorities, is preferable to a de facto 
ceding of enforcement policy to the opaque discretion of LEAs and 
other actors within the local criminal justice apparatus. 
Are there any reasons to value the status quo?  Might the stand-
 
 201  According to one survey, 51% of city police departments and 44% of county 
sheriffs had no policies with regard to whether and when officers should seek to 
investigate an individual’s immigration status.  Varsanyi et al., supra note 167, at 146; 
see also Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV. 
901, 923 (2011) (arguing that nearly any “transparent policy to guide police 
discretion,” whether it emanates from the federal, state, or local levels of 
government, is preferable to “none at all”). 
 202  Because an LEA might be subject to different city-, county-, and state-level 
policies, any of these may be used to justify the exercise of street-level discretion.  See, 
e.g., Varsanyi et al., supra note 167, at 151 (describing how multijurisdictional overlap 
allows individual officers to use their discretion without direct accountability). 
 203  Schuck, supra note 10, at 70. 
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off between the federal government and states and localities be 
tolerable, or even valuable, as an exercise in uncooperative 
federalism?204  Incontestably, there is value in this sort of 
disagreement, in the “institutional equivalent of civil disobedience.”205  
But if the value of non-cooperation is not solely to “throw[] a 
wrench”206 into the enforcement of federal law, but also “to change 
national policy,”207 then its value is contingent on its outcomes. 
Doubtless, many sub-federal political actors, dissatisfied though 
they may be with federal policy, find their own lack of de jure 
authority quite advantageous.  De jure disempowerment allows sub-
federal officials to engage in blame-shifting, and it allows rebellious 
jurisdictions to set or frame the agenda.  As Rick Su argues, Arizona 
and other restrictionist actors succeeded in focusing the public 
debate on the “amnesty”/”attrition by enforcement” dichotomy, 
ascribing to the federal government the unwillingness to enforce the 
law.208  If a success for Arizona, it is largely a symbolic one: framing 
the choice as one between amnesty and attrition is a dead-end 
proposition as a practical matter.  And as argued in Part I, the choice 
between deporting the entire deportable population and deporting 
none fails to capture what is actually at stake in managing migration.  
It fails to capture the substantive reasons why people oppose, 
welcome, or tolerate immigrants in their midst. 
D. A Path to Decentralization of Priority-Setting 
This Article offered a functional argument for decentralizing 
priority setting, and an account of the status quo that highlights the 
practical shortcomings of centrally determined, nation-wide 
priorities.  While a fully worked-out proposal for decentralizing 
priority-setting is beyond the scope of this Article, a few observations 
are useful to demonstrate the feasibility of such a proposal. 
How might decentralized priority-setting be instituted?  It might 
 
 204  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, YALE 
L. J. 1256, 1264 (2009) (arguing that there is “a normative case for valuing such 
resistance”). The invocation of uncooperative federalism here is not intended to 
imply that any one of the dominant models of federalism describes or should inform 
the relationship between federal and sub-federal states.  As Huntington, supra note 
13, at 830, rightly observes, “[c]urrent state and local immigration regulation does 
not fall neatly into any one model of federalism but instead embodies strains of many 
of the models.” 
 205  Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 204, at 1271. 
 206  Id. at 1280. 
 207  Id. at 1272. 
 208  Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013). 
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be accomplished by simply offering states or localities the option to 
formulate their own priorities, or to default to the federal priorities.  
The jurisdictions that choose to formulate their own might generate 
them by a legislative, administrative, or some other process.  At 
present, ICE officers and attorneys in every field office must consult 
federal priorities every time a deportable immigrant is brought to 
their attention.  There is no overriding reason why the priorities of 
the jurisdiction that identified the individual cannot be considered in 
the same manner.  Though doubtless more administratively complex, 
this sort of determination is not all that different from what was 
required of INS officials prior to the creation of DHS.209 
Some jurisdictions are likely to refuse to go through the 
exercise.  A county that is unwavering in its adherence to “attrition by 
enforcement” may carry on the same subversive tactics described 
above in the face of the default federal priorities.  In such a case, the 
situation would be at worst unchanged.  At best, however, 
constituents who harbor distinct concerns related to unauthorized 
immigration might pressure their officials to opt out from the federal 
default and craft more locally appropriate priorities.  In a regime 
where sub-federal levels of government have the option to 
meaningfully influence deportation patterns, shifting the blame for 
misplaced priorities onto the federal government would not be quite 
as advantageous. 
What kinds of priorities might jurisdictions choose?  A 
jurisdiction that places no value on targeting aggravated felons or 
national security risks would be a rare phenomenon indeed.  With 
regard to these cases, the federal invocation of a “broad consensus” is 
plausible.  These cases, however, are a small share of all deportees.210  
 
 209  See CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE INS INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY: 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY 2 (2002) (statement of Richard Stana, Director, Justice Issues) (In 1999, 
INS identified five non-mutually-exclusive priorities for interior enforcement.  The 
third consideration, in order of importance, called upon INS officials to “[r]espond 
to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration.  In addition to 
responding to local law enforcement issues and needs, this strategic priority 
emphasizes working with local communities to identify and address problems that 
arise from the impact of illegal immigration, based on local threat assessments.”), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA402860. 
 210  While opinions differ on which felonies are dangerous, examining the crimes 
for which aliens are most commonly deported is instructive.  In 2011, criminal aliens 
made up 48% of all removals.  Only 15% of all removals are for crimes such as 
assault, larceny, robbery, burglary, and sexual and family offences.  Over 65% of 
criminal aliens (about 31% of all removals) were convicted of criminal traffic 
offenses, drug crimes (including possession), or criminal immigration violations 
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And some “sanctuary” jurisdictions are likely to have no further 
priorities.  For the remainder, jurisdictions may choose to target 
enforcement resources on any number of bases.  Those bases may be 
geographic, with priority accorded to deportations from a township 
rather than another.  They may be occupational, with priority 
accorded to deporting, say, construction workers (who are perceived 
to compete with the native work force in a given area) over 
agricultural workers (who address an otherwise unmet demand for 
labor).  They may depend on familial status, focusing on adults 
without children, but forbearing with regard to families with children 
in areas where school enrollment is otherwise insufficient.  Or, 
priorities may be based on any other basis that is plausibly related to 
the consequences of migrant presence of most serious concern to the 
particular community (and does not run afoul of constitutional 
protections).211  It is not easy to predict what criteria priorities would 
be based on precisely because this is not an exercise sub-federal 
authorities have engaged in often.  One might suspect however, that 
remaining in the country after a final removal order, a priority for 
DHS, does not correlate very well with any consequences of 
immigration that are likely to concern citizens most. 
 This is not an argument for devolving final control over 
deportation decisions, to which there are binding legal obstacles.  
DHS would retain control over final orders, including the ability to 
forbear from action with respect to categories of migrants that 
present specific and compelling national interests.  For example, 
local priorities would yield before a determination of a Temporary 
Protected Status for a particular group of immigrants or the need to 
deport individuals who present a threat to national security.  ICE may 
even continue to exercise discretion on the basis of humanitarian 
factors.  None of these categories are likely to be numerically 
significant.  Even the long list of humanitarian factors ICE identifies 
as grounds for forbearance rarely result in such: the systematic review 
 
(including entry and reentry).  JOHN SIMANSKY & LESLEY M. SAPP, DHS, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011 6 (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. 
 211  Formal priority-setting would be no more immune from constitutional equal-
protection constraints than law enforcement practices: to the extent that racial 
profiling and discriminatory enforcement practices run afoul of constitutional 
protections, so would priorities based on grounds of race or nationality.  Moreover, 
an attempt to prioritize immigrants of a particular ethnicity or nationality over others 
is not a practically useful criterion, insofar as the majority of immigrants in most 
areas are homogenous in this regard.  
TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:46 PM 
168 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:107 
 
of all pending cases for conformance with federal priorities closed 
about 2% of those reviewed.212  A considerable share of deportees may 
be selected in accordance with sub-federal priorities without 
interfering with the focus on the most dangerous felons or 
forbearance with regard to humanitarian factors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Immigration and immigration enforcement laws manage 
unavoidable demographic change.  Some commentators have 
claimed that there is no “fixing” the immigration enforcement system 
until we fix the immigration system, by pushing through 
comprehensive immigration reform.  It is imprudent to think, 
however, that even a significant liberalization of the legal admission 
criteria and a wide-reaching amnesty would obviate the need to think 
hard about the deportation conundrum.213  Legal constraints on 
immigration are not futile.  But what we have learned about 
migration suggests strongly that it is considerably more responsive to 
economic factors and push factors than legal constraints in source 
countries.214  As two prominent scholars of migration conclude, 
 
 212 See TRAC, ICE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION PROGRAM (June 28, 2012) (On 
August 11, 2011, DHS announced a comprehensive review of all removal cases 
pending before (and incoming to) the EOIR, to separate priority from non-priority 
cases, and administratively close the latter.), available at  
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/.  
 213  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the 
Rule of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2008) (Lest mistaken hopes be repeated, 
recall that the claim in 1986 was “that we were going to end illegal immigration 
forever. . . .  This story does not sell today.  There is no reasonable claim that the 
package of measures that were debated in the House and the Senate and supported 
by the President will have any material impact on undocumented migration.”). 
 214  See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Riosmena, Undocumented Migration from 
Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 294 (2010) (“Available data have consistently pointed up the failure of U.S. 
policies to reduce undocumented migration from Latin America. . . .  Our estimates 
suggest that undocumented migration is grounded more in mechanisms posited by 
social capital theory and the new economics of labor migration . . . .  As a result, U.S. 
efforts to increase the costs of undocumented entry and reduce the benefits of 
undocumented labor have proven unsuccessful given the widespread access of Latin 
Americans to migrant networks.  The main effect of U.S. enforcement efforts has 
been to reduce the circularity of Latin American migration.”); Angela S. García, 
Return to Sender? A Comparative Analysis of Immigrant Communities in ‘Attrition Through 
Enforcement’ Destinations, 2012 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1 (2012) (“[T]he analysis 
indicates that immigrants do not alter the duration of time they spend in receiving 
locales or change their state of residence due to restrictive subnational policies. 
Rather, economic and social factors more prominently shape immigrants’ settlement 
and residency patterns.”), available at http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-
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“migration flows can become self-sustaining and virtually 
unstoppable.”215  The Gallup Poll estimates that: 
[a]bout 13% of the world’s adults—or more than 640 
million people—say they would like to leave their country 
permanently.  Roughly 150 million adults say they would 
like to move to the U.S.—giving it the undisputed title as 
the world’s most desired destination for potential migrants 
since Gallup started tracking these patterns in 2007.216 
The United States will continue to be a magnet for people all 
over the world.  This is so in large part for reasons beyond the 
nation’s control.217  In that light, our immigration laws and 
enforcement policies are not simply mechanisms to select new 
members of the national community at our leisure, but indispensable 
tools to manage inevitable demographic change.  The feasible 
choices entail selecting which types of people the country will 
welcome, or at least tolerate, and which it will seek to expel—not the 
choices between complete enforcement and minimal enforcement.  
Focusing the national conversation almost exclusively on the latter 
dimension is both divisive and counterproductive.  Inviting sub-
federal governments to participate in a conversation about priorities 
in immigration enforcement would be a step towards changing that 
conversation. 
 
 
content/uploads/2012/08/Garcia-2012-ERS_Return-to-Sender.pdf; Emilio A. 
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